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ABSTRACT 
Intellectual property policy requires balance between the goal of 
motivating innovation and the need to prevent that motivation from 
stifling further innovation.  The constitutional grant of congressional 
power to motivate innovation by securing “for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries” is qualified by the requirement that congressional 
enactments under the Intellectual Property Clause “promote progress.” 
The speed of technological change, particularly in the converging 
fields of computer software, music, video, television, and 
communications, coupled with the power of technology industry 
lobbying, have left the statutory balance tilted in favor of rewarding 
innovators at the expense of further innovation and of consumers.  A 
particularly vulnerable class of consumers consists of “early adopters,” 
consumers who buy early stage technology before an industry standard 
is established.  These consumers invest not only in the machinery of the 
early stage technology but also in the acquisition of libraries of data 
(including audio and video libraries) which are specific to the 
technology platform.  These early adopters contribute significantly to 
the ultimate success or failure of new technologies and do so at the risk 
of losing their investment, and needing to reacquire their libraries, if a 
different technology prevails as the industry standard and renders their 
early choice obsolete.   
The Supreme Court has already recognized a time-shifting exception 
to the intellectual property rights of innovators and lower courts have 
recognized a place-shifting exception.  It is now the time and place for a 
general technology-shifting exception which would allow consumers to 
shift their media libraries from one format to another without violating 
intellectual property law.   
This Article begins with a brief history of the Intellectual Property 
Clause, congressional implementation of the clause, and judicial 
responses.  It then summarizes the role of early adopters in “promoting 
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progress” and argues that while Congress has broad discretion in 
balancing “promoting progress” with securing authors and inventors 
“exclusive rights,” protection of the early adopters’ role is 
constitutionally required.  Next, it illustrates how securing a right of 
technology-shifting (transferring patented or copyrighted works from an 
older, obsolete, technology to a new technology) satisfies the 
requirement of promoting progress and fits within the historical model.  
Finally, it proposes both statutory and judicial steps toward protection 
of this right. 
INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property laws require a balance between the need to 
motivate innovation and the need to prevent that motivation from 
stifling further innovation.  The foundation of copyright and patent law1 
is Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which gives Congress the 
power to secure “for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries,”2 but that 
power is subject to the duty “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.”3 
That congressional power is implemented through federal patent (35 
 
1. Trademark law finds its foundation in a different source, the Commerce Clause.  See 
discussion infra Part II.C. 
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  The clause is variously referred to in the literature as 
the Copyright Clause, the Patent Clause, or the Intellectual Property Clause.  For a detailed 
history of how the clause was drafted and adopted, see Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote 
the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual 
Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1994).  Some of the 
terms used in the clause arguably had different meanings in the eighteenth century than they 
do today.  “Author” had a broader meaning which included “he to whom anything owes its 
origin; . . . one who completes a work of science or literature.”  Burrow-Giles Lithographic 
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (quoting Worcester).  This would have been the 
meaning of “Author of liberty” as used in the fourth verse of America.  REV. SAMUEL 
FRANCIS SMITH, America (1831), available at 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/ihas/loc.natlib.ihas.200000012/default.html (last visited Jan. 9, 
2010).  The original manuscript is online at the Library of Congress website, available at 
http://cweb2.loc.gov/diglib/ihas/loc.natlib.ihas.1000010476/default.html.  The term “useful 
arts” was used to distinguish from “liberal arts” and referred to what would today be called 
“technology.”  Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  For a discussion of the 
contemporary meaning of “inventor,” see Max Stul Oppenheimer, Harmonization Through 
Condemnation: Is New London the Key to World Patent Harmony?, 40 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 445 (2007). 
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  It is convenient to refer to the “promote the [p]rogress” 
phrase as the preamble and the balance of the clause as the body of the Intellectual Property 
Clause. 
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U.S.C.) and copyright (17 U.S.C.) statutes, each of which provide 
general protection for innovators coupled (consistent with the 
constitutional duty) with exceptions designed to minimize certain 
aspects of the innovation-stifling effects of monopolies.  While patents 
and copyrights are authorized by the same clause of the Constitution, 
their implementing statutes differ and congressional attitudes toward 
the two regimes have been radically different.  While patent rights have 
been under attack and restricted, Congress has expanded copyright 
owners’ rights, to the point where several Supreme Court Justices have 
questioned whether the rights exceed constitutional authority. 
Overly broad intellectual property rights injure competitors and 
consumers.  A particularly vulnerable class of consumers consists of 
“early adopters,” consumers who adopt early stage technology before 
an industry standard is established (for example, buyers of Radio 
Shack’s Tandy computer, Sony’s Betamax videorecorder or Toshiba’s 
HDD high-definition DVD players).  These consumers invest not only 
in the machinery necessary to use the early stage technology but also in 
the time and effort to learn how to make use of the technology before it 
has been fully tested by large groups of users, and in the development of 
libraries of data that can only be accessed using the new machinery.  
These early adopters contribute significantly to the ultimate success or 
failure of new technologies and do so at the risk of losing their 
investment if a different technology prevails as the industry standard, 
rendering their choice obsolete. 
Congress has the initial responsibility for striking the appropriate 
balance between motivation of innovators on the one hand, and 
prevention of innovation-stifling overprotection (and consequently 
protection of the general public) on the other.  There are examples of 
congressional balancing in both the copyright and patent statutes.  The 
copyright statute contains a fair use exception, which permits the use of 
copyrighted works for purposes such as criticism, and also contains an 
exclusion of protection for ideas, which permits experimentation with 
alternative expressions of underlying concepts.  The patent statute 
contains an exception for medical research and also contains a general 
exclusion of protection for laws of nature, which prevents 
monopolization of fundamental discoveries that might otherwise 
prevent development of entire fields. 
The speed of technological change, particularly in the converging 
fields of computer software, music, video, television, and 
communications, coupled with the power of technology industry lobbies, 
has left the statutory balance tilted in favor of rewarding innovators at 
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the expense of further innovation and of consumers. 
Courts have held that additional protections are required by the 
constitutional duty to promote progress: the Supreme Court recognized 
a time-shifting exception to the rights of innovators in Sony Corp. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc.,4 and lower courts have recognized a place-
shifting exception.5  It is now the time and place for a technology-
shifting exception. 
Ideally, Congress should amend the copyright and patent statutes to 
provide this exception.  The “exclusive” rights that the Constitution 
authorizes Congress to grant are exclusive in the sense of “rights to 
exclude” rather than “all-inclusive rights.”  Thus, there is room to 
reward innovators with exclusive rights while still reserving sufficient 
rights to guard against stifling further innovation.  Until Congress takes 
such action, the courts should recognize that all statutory patent and 
copyright rights are subject to a constitutionally required right of 
technology-shifting. 
I.  THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CHALLENGE: MOTIVATING 
INNOVATION WITHOUT IMPEDING PROGRESS 
Patents and copyrights existed in eighteenth-century England and 
the colonies, although they differed from modern patents and 
copyrights.6  The Articles of Confederation reserved the power to grant 
copyrights and patents to the states rather than create a federal system.7  
New Jersey,8 New York,9 Rhode Island,10 and Virginia11 all had copyright 
statutes, although those statutes secured authors’ rights prior to 
publication, rather than the modern statute’s right to prevent others 
 
4. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
5. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 
1999); In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 652 (7th Cir. 2003). 
6. All of the colonial statutes were directed toward protecting what would now be 
classed as “literary” works.  Works of visual art were not covered and, of course, the concept 
of recorded sound was unknown at the time (and protection of sound recordings did not enter 
the copyright statute until the late twentieth century.  17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(7) (2006).  Act 
of Oct. 15, 1971. Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971), amended by Pub. L. No. 93-573, 88 
Stat. 1873 (1974) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006)). 
7. Article II of the Articles of Confederation specifically reserved to the states all 
rights not expressly granted to the United States.  No right to grant patents or copyrights was 
included in Articles II and IX of the Articles of Confederation. 
8. Act of May 27, 1783, for the Promotion and Encouragement of Literature. 
9. Act of April 29, 1786, to Promote Literature. 
10. Act of December, 1783, for the Benefit of Publishing. 
11. Act of October 1785, for Authors of Literary Works. 
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from using the published work.  Georgia12 and New Hampshire13 
recognized both copyrights and patents.  Most colonial patents were 
granted by special acts of the legislature, but at least one state, South 
Carolina, had a general patent statute.14  Other state constitutions 
explicitly prohibited the grant of monopolies15 and in any event, colonial 
patents appear to have been rarely granted and rarely enforced.16 
By the time of the Constitutional Convention, James Madison could 
observe in hindsight that “[t]he States cannot separately make effectual 
provision for either [patents or copyrights]”17 and the Convention 
incorporated Article I, Section 8, Clause 2, the basis of modern patent 
and copyright law,18 into the Constitution.  The Intellectual Property 
Clause empowers Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”19  The 
records of the Constitutional Convention shed little light on the reason 
for including the Intellectual Property Clause.  The clause was adopted 
without debate by the full Convention and with little record of 
committee deliberations.20  The patent language in particular appears to 
 
12. Act of February 3, 1786, for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius. 
13. Act of November 7, 1783, for the Encouragement of Literature and Genius. 
14. “The Inventors of useful machines shall have a like exclusive privilege of making or 
vending their machines for the like term of fourteen years, under the same privileges and 
restrictions hereby granted to, and imposed on, the authors of books.”  An Act for the 
Encouragement of Arts and Sciences, 1784 S.C. Pub. Laws 333–34.  Goldstein v. California, 
412 U.S. 546, 557 n.13 (1973) (describing five patents issued by the Colonies). 
15. Two states that explicitly prohibited monopolies are Maryland and North Carolina.  
MD. CONST. of 1776,  Declaration of Rights, art. XLI, § 39 (1867) (“[M]onopolies are odious, 
contrary to the spirit of a free government, and the principles of commerce; and ought not to 
be suffered.”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, A Declaration of Rights, art. XXIII (1868) 
(“[P]erpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free State, and ought not to be 
allowed.”). 
16. Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 16 (“One indication of the relatively low value 
attached to patents is the fact that no record has been found of any litigation involving 
colonial patents . . . .”). 
17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 287 (James Madison) (The Heritage Press, 1945). 
18. Trademark law’s foundation is the Commerce Clause rather than the Intellectual 
Property Clause.  Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–
1141 (2006).  There are substantive reasons to treat trademarks differently from patents and 
copyrights, discussed infra Part II.C. 
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  The clause is variously referred to in the literature as 
the Copyright Clause, the Patent Clause, or the Intellectual Property Clause. 
20. “No delegate to the Constitutional Convention has left any record concerning the 
interpretation or meaning placed on the intellectual property clause by the delegates 
themselves.”  Edward C. Walterscheid, Inherent or Created Rights: Early Views on the 
Intellectual Property Clause, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 92 (1995). 
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have been added in committee with no record of who made the addition 
or why.21  The first mention of a section directed to intellectual property 
appears in the records of August 18, 1787, when it was proposed to 
grant the federal government the power “[t]o secure to literary authors 
their copy rights for a limited time . . . [;] [t]o encourage, by proper 
premiums and provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and 
discoveries . . . [;] [t]o grant patents for useful inventions[;] [and t]o 
secure to Authors exclusive rights for a certain time.”22  It appears that 
at least four alternatives were discussed: (1) “To secure to literary 
authors their copy rights for a limited time”;23 (2) “To encourage by 
premiums & provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and 
discoveries”;24 (3) “To grant patents for useful inventions”;25 and (4) “To 
secure to Authors exclusive rights for a certain time.”26 
The proposal was referred to the Committee of Detail27 where it 
appears to have remained without further attention until August 31, 
1787, when it was referred to the Grand Committee of Eleven along 
with a number of other unresolved proposals.28  On September 5, 1787, 
the Committee of Eleven presented the Intellectual Property Clause to 
the Convention in its final form;29 on September 12, the Committee of 
 
21. Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 51 (“There is no record to indicate how the 
intellectual property proposals submitted by Madison and Pinckney were transformed into 
this clause.  Madison, as a member of the responsible committee, must have known but never 
explained it. Nor did any other member of the Committee.”).  Walterscheid notes that there 
are inconsistent records of who proposed the clause, even within Madison’s notes.  Id. at 50–
51. 
22. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 321–22 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1937); see also Kevin D. Galbraith, Note, Forever on the Installment Plan? An 
Examination of the Constitutional History of the Copyright Clause and Whether the Copyright 
Term Extension Act of 1998 Squares with the Founders’ Intent, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1119, 1140 (2002). 
23. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 
477 (Ohio University Press 1984) (Madison’s suggestion on August 18, 1787). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 478 (Pinckney’s suggestion). 
26. Id.  Pinckney also suggested, “[t]o establish seminaries for the promotion of 
literature and the arts & sciences” and “[t]o establish public institutions, rewards and 
immunities for the promotion of agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures.”  Id. 
27. BRUCE W. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 192–
93 n.7 (1967). 
28. MADISON, supra note 23, at 569.  The Grand Committee of Eleven comprised one 
member from each state except Rhode Island and New York, which did not have delegates 
present at the time. Id. 
29. Galbraith, supra note 22, at 1140. (“On September 5, 1787 . . . the Committee of 
Eleven reported back with the following language: ‘To promote the progress of Science and 
useful arts by securing for limited times to authors & inventors the exclusive right to their 
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Stile and Arrangement presented the Constitution to the full 
Convention, with the Intellectual Property Clause unchanged, and on 
September 17, the clause was approved unanimously and without 
debate or any other record of why the interim language changes were 
made.30 
Although there is little evidence on which to base a proof, logical 
arguments have been suggested for why such a clause might have been 
included in an eighteenth-century political document. The three most 
compelling arguments are that the clause was designed to provide an 
incentive to innovate, that the clause did no more than acknowledge 
what would have been viewed at the time as the natural property of 
authors and inventors,31 and that the clause was meant to limit the ways 
in which the federal government could reward inventors and authors.32 
An essay written during the ratification debates supports the first 
argument: that the justification for the clause was to reward inventors 
and authors.  The essay further observes that the Intellectual Property 
Clause rewards inventors and authors without committing government 
resources, which the new federal government simply did not have.33 
Supporting the “natural property” argument are contemporary 
statements such as those by the literary property committee of the 
Constitutional Convention, which was “persuaded that nothing is more 
properly a man’s own than the fruit of his study,”34 of James Madison,35 
 
respective writings and discoveries.’”). 
30. Id. at 1140–41.  
On September 12, the Committee of Stile and Arrangement reported to the full 
Convention the entire Constitution, which contained the Copyright Clause with the 
language unchanged from the September 5 version.  On September 17, the 
Constitution was adopted and signed by the delegates, and there was no recorded 
debate of the Copyright Clause.   
Id. See also Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 26. 
31. See discussion supra Part I. 
32. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (“The clause is both a grant of 
power and a limitation.”). 
33. Remarks on the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, 6 American Museum or 
Repository of Ancient and Modern Fugitive Pieces 303 (1789) (“As to those monopolies, 
which, by way of premiums, are granted for certain years to ingenious discoveries in 
countries, and more necessary in this, as the government has no resources to reward 
extraordinary merit.”). 
34. The committee language actually supports all three theories: that intellectual 
property is “properly a man’s own,” that protecting it would “encourage genius,” and that it 
would promote “extension of arts and commerce.”   
The committee, consisting of Mr. [Hugh] Williamson, Mr. [Ralph] Izard and Mr. 
[James] Madison, to whom were referred sundry papers and memorials from 
different persons on the subject of literary property, being persuaded that nothing is 
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and of John Witherspoon.36  While consistent with natural rights 
philosophy, these views find little historical support.  A contemporary 
scholar looking to English precedent would have been led to the 1602 
case of Darcy v. Allein37 and the 1623 Statute of Monopolies.38  In Darcy, 
the court invalidated a monopoly granted by Queen Elizabeth I on 
playing cards, holding monopolies generally illegal and detrimental 
because they raised prices, reduced the availability of goods, and 
reduced competition.39  The court acknowledged that the monopoly at 
issue was a “royal favor” monopoly and that an inventor who “by his 
own charge and industry, or by his own wit or invention doth bring any 
new trade into the realm whether by a truly new invention or by 
bringing to England a new trade or industry known elsewhere—might 
 
more properly a man’s own than the fruit of his study, and that the protection and 
security of literary property would greatly tend to encourage genius, to promote 
useful discoveries and to the general extension of arts and commerce, beg leave to 
submit the following report: Resolved, That it be recommended to the several states, 
to secure to the authors or publishers of any new books not hitherto printed, being 
citizens of the United States, and to their heir or assigns executors, administrators 
and assigns, the copyright of such books for a certain time, not less than fourteen 
years from the first publication; and to secure to the said authors, if they shall 
survive the term first mentioned, and to their heirs or assigns executors, 
administrators and assigns, the copyright of such books for another term of time not 
less than fourteen years, such copy or exclusive right of printing, publishing and 
vending the same, to be secured to the original authors, or publishers, or their 
assigns their executors, administrators and assigns, by such laws and under 
restrictions as to the several states may seem proper. 
24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 326–27 (Friday, May 2, 1783) (Gaillard 
Hunt ed., Government Printing Office 1922) (strikethrough in original text), available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwjclink.html (last visited April 14, 2010).  Note that 
the proposal is much more specific than the clause that ultimately was adopted.  
35. “The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned.  The copyright of authors has 
been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right at common law.  The right to useful 
inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 
287 (James Madison) (The Heritage Press, 1945).  Nimmer concludes, however, that 
Madison’s reference to the control over unpublished works afforded eighteenth-century 
British authors as “common law copyright” is “somewhat inaccurate[].”  1 MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.02 (2009). 
36. Witherspoon believed that society owed inventors reasonable compensation for the 
use of their inventions.  John Witherspoon, Lectures on Moral Philosophy, in THE SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF JOHN WITHERSPOON 152, 228 (Thomas Miller ed., Southern Illinois University 
Press 1990). 
37. Darcy v. Allein (The Case of Monopolies), 11 Co. Rep. 84 b., 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 
(K.B. 1602). 
38. Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6.
 39. Darcy v. Allein (The Case of Monopolies), 11 Co. Rep. 84 b., 77 Eng. Rep. 1260. 
Darcy v. Allein, (1378–1865) Noy, 173, 182, 74 Eng. Rep. 1131, 1139 (K.B. 1602). 
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usefully receive a monopoly.”40  In 1623, Parliament enacted the Statute 
of Monopolies, which codified the general prohibition of monopolies 
but, like the court in Darcy, it recognized the distinction between royal 
favors and inventions and provided that the general prohibition of 
monopolies should  
 
not extend to any letters patents [] and grants of privilege for the 
term of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole 
working or making of any manner of new manufactures within 
this realm [] to the true and first inventor []and inventors of such 
manufactures, which others at the time of making such letters 
patents and grants shall not use[], so as also they be not contrary 
to the law nor mischievous to the state . . . .41 
 
These sources do not justify patents or copyrights as natural rights 
and in fact classify inventors together with importers of “a new trade or 
industry known elsewhere that was never used before.”  Rather, they 
justify them on the basis of a closely related natural right that would 
have been recognized in the eighteenth century—the right to maintain a 
trade secret.42  As Thomas Jefferson observed, “[i]f nature has made any 
one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is . . . 
an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps 
it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the 
possession of every one . . . .”43  
 
40. Id. 
41. Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 6. 
42. Trade secret protection arises under common law but has been codified by statute 
(most of which are based on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act) in a majority of states and the 
District of Columbia.  See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (1985).  The general requirements for 
protection of a common law trade secret, or its codified version, are the possession of 
confidential information, which confers an economic benefit on those with knowledge of such 
information, plus reasonable steps to maintain its confidentiality.  The common law, and its 
codified version, prohibit misappropriation of such secrets.  See id. § 1(4).  Federal law 
provides trade secret protection in certain limited circumstances.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–
2315 (2006); Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§  1831–1839.  
43. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THE 
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 525, 530 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., The Viking Press 1975).  
Jefferson further observed: “Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, 
because every other possesses the whole of it.  He who receives an idea from me, receives 
instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light 
without darkening me.”  Id.  “This observation was clearly a lapse of economic judgment for 
the sake of rhetoric.  The basis of trade secret law is that there is economic value in keeping 
competitors in the dark.”  Max Stul Oppenheimer, In Vento Scribere: The Intersection of 
Cyberspace and Patent Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 229, 236 n.20 (1999). 
OPPENHEIMER FORMAT 5-17-10 5/26/2010  2:19 PM 
2010] “TECHNOLOGY-SHIFTING” RIGHTS 279 
 
This natural right to one’s trade secrets suggests the third theory of 
justification for an Intellectual Property Clause: motivating neither 
invention nor authorship but rather disclosure.  Inventors and authors 
have two options for profiting from their work: keep the work 
confidential, thus relying on trade secret protection,44 or commercialize 
the work publicly.  Public commercialization irrevocably surrenders the 
trade secret.  Without the protection of intellectual property law, 
competitors who thus learn the secret can make use of it without having 
spent the time and money to develop it.  In economic terms, this gives 
the competitor an advantage over the innovator since the competitor’s 
pricing does not need to recover research and development costs.  
Facing a competitor who can use the same innovation at lower cost 
reduces the incentive to innovate.  Thus, by providing the right to 
exclude competitors from the use of the innovation for a limited term, 
the Intellectual Property Clause may be viewed as an incentive to 
encourage innovators to share their ideas.45 
It follows that the rights granted by intellectual property law must be 
limited in duration—otherwise, the public receives no benefit from the 
exchange while the innovator no longer risks the loss of trade secret 
rights and in effect obtains a perpetual monopoly.  This limitation is 
expressed in the preamble46 to the Intellectual Property Clause47 and its 
 
44. As long as the requirements for trade secrecy (valuable confidential information as 
to which reasonable steps are taken to maintain its confidentiality) are met, a trade secret 
may be maintained—in theory, indefinitely.  A public disclosure of the trade secret would 
destroy it. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985). 
45. Some inventions lend themselves to commercialization without surrendering trade 
secrecy.  For example, a machine that makes it cheaper to produce an end product may be 
kept as a trade secret while the inventor profits by sale of the end product.  Most states 
recognize reverse engineering of a publicly sold product as beyond the protection of trade 
secret law.  See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).  Thus, 
products that reveal the secret are difficult to commercialize while maintaining trade secrecy, 
and for this reason works of authorship are often difficult to commercialize while maintaining 
trade secrecy.  However, computer software is a large commercially valuable class of works of 
authorship that may be commercialized publicly, protected by copyright and maintained as a 
trade secret by releasing executable code only, or by marketing services performed using the 
software rather than the software itself.  “Cloud computing” utilizes this business model. 
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Whether the preamble (in order “to promote the 
Progress”) is a limitation on Congress’s power or merely precatory has been extensively 
analyzed.  The secondary literature debating whether the language limits Congress’s power or 
merely explains why the Founders included a provision authorizing monopolies is analyzed 
infra Part II. 
47. “[T]he federal patent power stems from a specific constitutional provision which 
authorizes the Congress ‘To promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.’”  Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  “The 
clause is both a grant of power and a limitation.”  Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 
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purpose is twofold:  
 
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are 
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special 
private benefit . . . .  [They are] intended to motivate the creative 
activity of authors and inventors . . . and to allow the public 
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of 
exclusive control has expired.48 
 
For a clause with such enormous economic importance today, there 
is little historical record of discussion of its terms during the 
Constitutional Convention.  A number of explanations have been 
offered for this lack of debate: (1) support for patent rights and 
copyrights was universal and there was nothing to debate;49 (2) patents 
and copyrights were so unimportant that no one cared enough to debate 
the proposal;50 and (3) the Convention had limited time and more 
important issues to resolve.51 
Whatever the reason that the Convention directed little attention to 
the Intellectual Property Clause, Congress made use of the power 
quickly, passing the first patent statute52 and the first copyright statute53 
 
(1966). 
48. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).  Sony involved 
copyrights, but the Court’s analysis borrows heavily from patent law. 
49. Sidney A. Diamond, Our Patent System . . . The Past Is Prologue, 62 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 437, 440 (1980) (“The delegates clearly believed firmly that it was 
in the public interest to establish a patent and copyright system.”).  Unfortunately, this lack of 
controversy and legislative history has provided later scholars with little guidance as to the 
framers’ original intent. 
50. Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 16 (“One indication of the relatively low value 
attached to patents is the fact that no record has been found of any litigation involving 
colonial patents of monopoly for invention in any colonial or English court.”). 
51. Morgan Sherwood, The Origins and Development of the American Patent System, 
71 AM. SCI. 500 (1983). 
The absence of debate over the patent provision . . . has been taken as proof of their 
firm belief in patents as the best way to encourage socially beneficial innovation.  
However, it is more likely that the authors of the Constitution proceeded without 
paying much attention to the subject, since they were also faced with the larger 
problems of how to structure the government, solve its fiscal difficulties, and defend 
the new nation. 
Id. at 500; Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 26 (“It may well have been that the 
delegates were tired [and] wanted to go home . . . .”). 
52. Act of Apr. 10, 1790 (Patent Act of 1790), ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–12 (1790) (repealed 
1793). 
53. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed 1802). 
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in the second term of its first session.  The first patent statute gave the 
Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Department of War, and the 
Attorney General (the “Commissioners for the Promotion of Useful 
Arts”)54 the power to grant a patent for fourteen years to anyone who 
“hath . . . invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, . . . or 
device, or any improvement therein not before known or used . . . .”55  
The first copyright statute56 gave “authors of any map, chart, book or 
books . . . being a [citizen or resident of the United States] . . . the sole 
right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing and vending [the 
same] for the term of fourteen years from the recording of the title 
thereof . . . .”57  Prints were added to the list of copyrightable categories 
in 1802,58 and the statute was later amended to accommodate 
technological advances.59 
II.  FINDING BALANCE: THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF 
LEGISLATIVE IMPLEMENTATION 
The Constitution gave Congress both a power and a limitation with 
regard to intellectual property: the power to provide innovators 
exclusive rights for limited times, subject to the limitation that the 
power be exercised so as to promote progress.60  Two main statutory 
intellectual property regimes emerge in Titles 17 (copyrights) and 35 
(patents) of the U.S. Code.  Both enactments provide the incentive of 
exclusivity for innovators61 coupled, consistent with the associated 
 
54. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1966). 
55. § 1, 1 Stat. at 110. 
56.  The term “copyright” was not used until 1831.  (“An act . . . respecting copyright.”  
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 4, 4 Stat. 436, 437 (1831)). 
57. § 1, 1 Stat. at 124. 
58. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171 (1802) (repealed). 
59. Specific provisions were added to cover motion pictures (17 U.S.C. § 106(4) 
(2006)); sound recordings (17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7)); computer software (17 U.S.C. § 117); and 
digital audio (17 U.S.C. § 106(6)). 
60. In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966), the Court held that 
“[i]nnovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are 
inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must ‘promote the 
Progress of . . . useful Arts.’ This is the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not 
be ignored.” Id. at 6.  See also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 
146–52 (1989); Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that the 
Constitution limits the patent statute to the “purpose of advancing the useful arts—the 
process today called technological innovation”). 
61. The patent incentive is provided in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006), which provides: 
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
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objective of promoting innovation, with exceptions designed to 
minimize certain innovation-impeding effects.62  The Constitution does 
not specify the specific term of exclusivity to be given as an incentive.  
In fact, Congress has from time to time changed the term and provided 
different terms for different types of intellectual property.63 
As with most provisions of the Constitution, the details were left to 
Congress with only broad guidance.  Working out the details requires 
resolving the extremely thorny issue of how to promote progress.  In the 
recent patent case of Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings, Inc. v. 
Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., Justice Breyer noted the fundamental 
problem:  
 
 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”  The copyright incentive is 
provided in 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006), which provides: 
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive 
rights to do and to authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public 
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual 
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the 
copyrighted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission. 
62. Major exceptions to the rights of patent owners include limiting patents to only 
four categories of statutory subject matter, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006), and excluding from patent 
protection “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas,” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175, 185 (1981), because “[p]henomena of nature, . . . mental processes, and abstract 
intellectual concepts are . . . the basic tools of scientific and technological work,” Gottschalk 
v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972), reflecting “a basic judgment that protection in such cases, 
despite its potentially positive incentive effects, would too often severely interfere with, or 
discourage, development and the further spread of useful knowledge itself,” Lab. Corp. of 
Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 128 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
Major exceptions to the rights of copyright owners include excluding underlying ideas from 
protection and excluding specific uses (notably fair use) from infringement, both discussed 
infra Part II.B. 
63. Most recently, it changed the term of United States Patents from seventeen years 
from date of issue to twenty years from date of application. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
Design patents last for fourteen years. See 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2006).  Copyrights originally 
lasted for fourteen years and were extendable for an additional fourteen years; under current 
law they may last for up to ninety years beyond the life of the author.  See discussion infra  
Part II.B. 
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sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than 
‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ the 
constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection. . . . 
The problem arises from the fact that patents do not only 
encourage research by providing monetary incentives for 
invention. Sometimes their presence can discourage research by 
impeding the free exchange of information . . . .64 
 
In addition, granting monopolies imposes a transaction cost—one 
wishing to avoid infringement must investigate existing grants to 
determine whether they might be infringed (which itself is costly) and 
must take the risk of liability for an incorrect conclusion.  The problem 
of such transaction costs surfaced early.  The 1793 patent statute65 
established a registration system, under which an applicant only needed 
to allege having “invented any new and useful art, machine, 
manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement on any art, machine, manufacture or composition of 
matter, not known or used before the application” and “present a 
petition to the Secretary of State,”66 at which point the Secretary was 
authorized to issue a patent without any examination of the validity of 
the applicant’s allegations.67  This system produced a large number of 
patents that were “worthless and void, as conflicting with, and infringing 
upon one another, or upon, public rights not subject to patent privilege; 
arising either from a want of due attention to the specifications of claim, 
or from the ignorance of the patentees of the state of the arts.”  This 
resulted in “a great number of lawsuits . . . which are daily increasing in 
an alarming degree, onerous to the courts, ruinous to the parties, and 
injurious to society.”68  In response, Congress amended the patent 
statute in 1836 and created a distinct Patent Office within the 
Department of State to review applications to determine patentability 
prior to issue.69  This initial review by the Patent Office reduces the 
number of patents that are issued and presumably rejects a significant 
 
64. Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. at 126–27 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citations 
omitted). 
65. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (repealed 1836). 
66. Id. at 319–20. 
67. Under the 1793 system, patents were issued “without any examination into the 
merit or novelty of the invention.”  SEN. JOHN RUGGLES, SENATE REPORT ACCOMPANYING 
S. 239, 24th Cong. at 3–4 (1st Sess. 1836). 
68. Id. 
69. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 119–20. 
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number or applications that should not be issued, therefore reducing 
transaction costs.  Issued patents are published and available at the 
Patent Office.  A full text database is also available online, making it 
possible to search for potential blocking patents.70  Although reduced, 
transaction costs associated with reviewing a large number of copyrights 
and patents to determine which of them must be avoided remain and 
can be significant, especially since the number of issued patents has 
risen dramatically.71  The same problem arises, of course, with respect to 
copyrights,72 and is potentially even more difficult to manage since 
copyrights need not be registered and it is therefore impossible to do a 
comprehensive search for potential infringement.  Furthermore, pre-
registration review by the Copyright Office is cursory—those copyrights 
that are registered are checked only to determine whether they meet the 
threshold standard for authorship (and whether the registration fee has 
been paid), not for similarity to other works.  “Our copyright system has 
no . . . provision for previous examination . . . [of] originality . . . .”73 
A.  The Federal Patent Statute: Rights and Exceptions 
Unlike copyrights, patents have no common law basis and exist 
purely as a federal legislative right.74  The power granted by the 
Intellectual Property Clause is exercised with respect to inventions in 
Title 35 of the U.S. Code.75  Regulations governing the Patent Office 
and processing of patent applications are contained in Title 37 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations,76 and specific internal rules governing the 
 
70. A blocking patent is a patent, which would be infringed by a product.  The U.S. 
Patent Office updates the database weekly and makes it available at http://patft.uspto.gov/. 
71. In the three years of operation under the 1790 statute, fifty-five patents were 
issued.  In 2008, the most recent year for which statistics are available, 157,772 utility patents 
were issued.  U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TECHNOLOGY MONITORING 
TEAM: TABLE OF ANNUAL U.S. PATENT ACTIVITY SINCE 1790 (2009),  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.pdf.  
72. It is impossible to determine the number of copyrights created in recent years since 
registration is no longer required.  The number of works registered, however, has grown from 
5,600 in 1870 (the first year for which records exist) to 526,378 in 2007, the last year for which 
statistics are available.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS: FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2007 58 (2007), 
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2007/ar2007.pdf. 
73. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884).   
74. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229–30 (1964); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006) (conferring 
exclusive federal judicial jurisdiction over patent matters). 
75. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–376 (2006). 
76. Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.1–501.11 (2009). 
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examination of patent applications are contained in the Manual of 
Patent Examining Procedure.77 
Three types of patents are authorized: utility patents,78 design 
patents,79 and plant patents.80  All three types of patents require 
disclosure, and eventually publication, of the claimed invention.81  Only 
utility patents pose the problem of technological obsolescence and are 
therefore the only category discussed below.  The fundamental 
exchange required by utility patent law is the inventor’s surrender of a 
trade secret in exchange for the patent, promoting progress (as the 
preamble of the Intellectual Property Clause requires)82 by putting the 
public in possession of information that the inventor could have 
withheld83 and giving the inventor the incentive of an assured term of 
 
77. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedure (8th ed., rev. 7, July 2008) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
78. Utility patents may be granted for inventions falling within one of four classes 
enumerated in the statute.  “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 
101.  Certain types of inventions that fall within one of these categories have been held not to 
be patentable under judicially created exceptions.  “[P]henomena of nature . . . are part of the 
storehouse of knowledge . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.” Funk Bros. 
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).  “Phenomena of nature, though just 
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they 
are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.” Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 
(1972). 
79. Design patents may be granted for novel ornamental designs.  35 U.S.C. § 171. 
80. Plant patents may be granted for distinct and new varieties of plants that have been 
asexually reproduced.  35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006).  Tuber propagated plants are excluded. 
81. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 122. 
82. An issued patent is public and therefore information contained in the application 
can no longer be maintained as a trade secret. 
83. In addition, the patent system is designed to motivate placing technology in the 
public domain promptly.  35 U.S.C. §§ 102(b) and 103 provide, in effect, a statute of 
limitations for filing a patent application and more generally the patent statute denies patents 
to applicants who have abandoned, suppressed or concealed their inventions.  35 U.S.C. § 
102(c).   
The courts have consistently held that an invention . . . is deemed abandoned, 
suppressed, or concealed if, within a reasonable time after completion, no steps are 
taken to make the invention publicly known. Thus, failure to file a patent 
application; to describe the invention in a publicly disseminated document; or to use 
the invention publicly, has been held to constitute abandonment, suppression or 
concealment. 
Int’l Glass Co., Inc. v. United States, 408 F.2d 395, 403 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (citations omitted).  
Commercial use of the claimed invention by the inventor for a significant period before filing 
a patent application also can result in loss of patent rights. In Metallizing Engineering Co. v. 
Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., the court explained, “If an inventor should be permitted 
to hold back from the knowledge of the public the secrets of his invention; if he should . . . 
make and sell his invention publicly, and thus gather the whole profits . . . it would materially 
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exclusive control over the invention (as the body of the Intellectual 
Property Clause requires).84 
1.  Providing the Required Time-Limited Incentive 
A patent gives its owner the right to stop competitors from making, 
using, selling, or importing the patented invention for a period starting 
on the date the patent is issued85 and ending twenty years after the date 
the patent application was filed.86  Violation of these rights by an 
infringer gives rise to damages which are to be “no . . . less than a 
reasonable royalty. . . .”87  Injunctions against infringement are also 
available,88 although not automatic89 and attorney fees may be awarded 
in certain cases.90 
2.  Furthering Progress 
The patent statute promotes technological progress directly by the 
incentive it offers for disclosure, but also indirectly by what it requires 
 
retard the progress of science and the useful arts.”  153 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir. 1946) (internal 
citation omitted).  There is an exception for experimental use by the inventor prior to filing a 
patent application if necessary in order to perfect the invention.  Elizabeth v. Pavement Co., 
97 U.S. 126, 135 (1877); Allied Colloids Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995). 
84. The patent owner’s control is exclusive (meaning the right to exclude) but not 
exhaustive—the patent owner can only prevent others from making, using, selling, or 
importing the patented invention. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a). 
85. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
86. The patent expires twenty years after the date the earliest application was filed 
(i.e., if there are a series of related patent applications, referred to as “continuing 
applications,” the term is measured from the date the first in the series was filed), and is 
subject to adjustment in certain circumstances related to delays in processing by the Patent 
Office. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006). 
87. 35 U.S.C. § 284.  Although the statute specifies that damages be “no less than a 
reasonable royalty,” in practice damages rarely exceed what is determined to be a reasonable 
royalty.  Third Wave Techs., Inc. v. Stratagene Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1011 (W.D. Wis. 
2005) (Under § 284, courts “imagine a negotiation between the patentee and infringer taking 
place at the moment the infringement began . . . [which] is an approach that experts have 
employed for decades in patent cases.”). 
88. “[C]ourts . . . may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to 
prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems 
reasonable.”  35 U.S.C. § 283. 
89. Because a patent is, by definition, unique, it might appear that damages would 
never be a completely adequate remedy for infringement—allowing an infringer to continue 
infringing and pay damages arguably does not protect the patent owner’s “exclusive” rights.  
However, in eBay, Inc., v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Court held that even in patent cases, a 
court must apply the traditional equitable four-factor test in deciding whether it is 
appropriate to issue an injunction.  547 U.S. 388 (2006).  
90. 35 U.S.C. § 285. 
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of patent applicants and what it excludes from patentability. 
The patent statute is designed to promote technological progress in 
four major ways: (1) it provides an incentive for the creation of 
something new (and conversely excludes protection for material which 
is already available to the public91 or would likely become available);92 
(2) it denies patents to certain fundamental discoveries deemed 
necessary for broad technological development;93 (3) it limits patents to 
inventions that the public did not already have;94 and (4) it requires that 
the innovator provide a description of how to make and use the 
invention so that, once the patent expires, the public has possession of 
the invention.95 
To accomplish these goals, the patent statute requires that in order 
to receive a patent, an inventor must file an application with the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).96  The application is 
reviewed for compliance with the patent statute, which requires, among 
other things, a determination that the claimed invention:97 (1) is a 
 
91. 35 U.S.C. § 102 denies patentability to ideas which were public either before their 
supposed invention by the patent applicant, § 102(a), or sufficiently long before the applicant 
chose to apply for a patent, § 102(b). The two subclauses have different purposes. Section 
102(a) reinforces the § 101 principle that only the inventor is entitled to a patent: if there 
were a printed publication describing the invention before the applicant’s date of invention, 
then that publication must have been written by someone else and the applicant cannot be 
the inventor. On the other hand, § 102(b) applies even if the applicant is the one who wrote 
the printed publication. The purpose of § 102(b) is to discourage inventors from delaying 
filing an application (thereby delaying, if not destroying, the public benefit of the disclosure 
of the invention) or from filing a patent application only after efforts to preserve a trade 
secret have failed.  In the case of copyrights, writings may only be protected to the extent that 
they are original.  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
92. “Inventions” must be truly inventive and not merely obvious improvements on 
existing knowledge.  35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966); 
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 261 (1850). 
93. “[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are also unpatentable.  
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
94. The claimed invention must be novel, 35 U.S.C. § 102, and non-obvious, 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103. 
95. “The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to 
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same . . . .”  35 U.S.C. § 112. 
96. 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). 
97. One of the required elements of a patent application is at least one claim.  The 
claims must define “the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.” 35 
U.S.C. § 112.  Consistent with the balance between protection of inventions and allowing 
public access to basic ideas, what is reviewed and may ultimately be protected by a patent is 
the claimed invention, not the underlying or background concepts. MPEP, supra note 77, § 
2106. 
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machine, manufacture, composition of matter or process;98 (2) is useful;99 
(3) is novel;100 (4) would not be considered obvious by a hypothetical 
person of ordinary skill in the field101  having complete knowledge of the 
prior art;102 and (5) is fully described—that is, the application  teaches 
how to make and use the invention.103 Only claims that are determined 
to satisfy the statutory requirements may be issued as a patent.104 
a.  Disclosure 
The patent statute furthers progress by requiring the public 
disclosure of the invention.  This accomplishes two things—it puts the 
public in possession of new knowledge and it destroys any trade secret 
rights.  It does so through the mechanism of requiring the filing of a 
written patent application that will be published no later than when the 
patent is issued.105  The patent application must describe and illustrate106 
how to make and use the invention and also disclose what the applicant 
 
98. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  These categories are collectively referred to as “statutory 
subject matter” and are the only types of inventions, which may be patented.  Kewanee Oil 
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) (“[N]o patent is available for a discovery, 
however useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the express categories of 
patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . .”).  Interpretation of the four categories is, 
however, broad, with the term “composition of matter” including “anything under the sun 
that is made by man.”  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 318 (1980) (rejecting the 
argument that a genetically engineered bacterium was implicitly excluded from statutory 
subject matter because, although a “composition of matter,” it was alive). 
99. 35 U.S.C. § 101.  The Federal Circuit views this requirement as constitutionally 
required so as to limit patentability to the “purpose of advancing the useful arts—the process 
today called technological innovation.” Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 
1985).  The Patent Office interprets § 101 to require that the claimed invention has a 
“specific, substantial, and credible [use].”  MPEP, supra note 77, § 2107.  
100. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–102.  Novelty generally means that the claimed invention was 
not available to the public before the applicant invented it, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a); or one year 
prior to the effective filing date of the applicant’s patent application, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
101. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
102. In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966). 
103. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
104. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 131, 151. 
105. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a “trade secret” as: 
[I]nformation . . . that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, 
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, 
and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy.   
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1985).  Publication of a patent destroys the associated 
trade secrets by two mechanisms: it makes them generally known, and it is a failure to make 
reasonable efforts to maintain their secrecy.  
106. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112, 113. 
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believes to be the best mode for carrying out the invention, referred to 
as the “enablement” and “best mode” requirements, respectively.107  The 
enablement requirement is designed to assure that the public gets access 
to enough information to practice the invention once the term of the 
patent expires.108  The best mode requirement is designed to prevent an 
applicant from disclosing a theoretically feasible but impractical way of 
implementing the invention while concealing a better way of doing so.109 
b.  Reservations: Statutory Subject Matter, Novelty and 
Obviousness/Exhaustion and Repair 
The patent statute also helps promote progress by what it reserves to 
future innovators and the public—limits on the types of advances that 
may be protected and limits on a patent owner’s enforcement rights. 
By statute, only certain categories of invention are patentable: 
processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter.110  
“[N]o patent is available for a discovery, however useful, novel, and 
nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the express categories of 
patentable subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101 . . . .”111  By judicial 
interpretation, certain types of inventions are not patentable even 
though they fall within one of the four categories of statutory subject 
matter.  “Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental 
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they 
are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”112  The balance 
between the constitutional goal of motivating disclosure and the risk of 
stifling innovation is delicate.  Innovation must be encouraged but basic 
theoretical discoveries must remain available for use by other 
innovators.  “While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of 
it, is not a patentable invention, a novel and useful structure created 
with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be.”113 
 
107. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention . . . and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out 
his invention.”). 
108. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
109. In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
110. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
111. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974). 
112. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).  See also Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. 
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (Laws of nature “are part of the storehouse of 
knowledge . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 
U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“[L]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas [are 
unpatentable].”). 
113. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188 (quoting Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 
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The novelty requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 102114 and the non-
obviousness requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 103115 taken together prevent 
granting patents in exchange for knowledge that was already available 
to the public, or which would likely have become available to the public 
without the applicant’s disclosure.  This assures that the public does not 
pay the price of granting a monopoly for something that it already has 
or, in the ordinary course of events, would have.  Patents are, as 
required by the preamble of the Intellectual Property Clause, an 
incentive to add to public knowledge and so should not be granted for 
knowledge which is already available to the public.116  As explained by 
the Supreme Court in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,117 
“[g]ranting patent protection to advances that would occur in the 
ordinary course without real innovation retards progress and may, in the 
case of patents combining previously known elements, deprive prior 
inventions of their value or utility.”118 
A patent owner—one who has satisfied all of the above 
requirements—obtains an “exclusive right” in the sense that the patent 
owner may exclude others from certain activities with respect to the 
patented invention.  The rights are not, however, “exclusive” in the 
sense of all encompassing.  Some of the more significant restrictions on 
the patent owners rights are encompassed in the doctrines of exhaustion 
and repair. 
 
306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939)); see also Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 268 (1854) (“It is 
for the discovery or invention of some practicable means or method of producing a beneficial 
result, or effect, that a patent is granted . . . .”). 
114. 35 U.S.C. § 102 provides:  
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—(a) the invention was known or used 
by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or 
a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or (b) the 
invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign 
country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the 
date of the application for patent in the United States . . . . 
115. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) provides:  
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or 
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the 
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject 
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.   
Section 103 was not added to the statute until 1952.  However, in 1850 the principle 
codified in § 103 was recognized by the Supreme Court as implicit in the patent 
statute.  Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 261 (1850). 
116. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966). 
117. 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
118. Id. at 419. 
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One of the exclusive rights that a patent confers is the exclusive right 
to sell products incorporating the patented technology.119  The 
exhaustion doctrine recognizes that the patent owner obtains the benefit 
of the patent monopoly when a patented product is first sold.  The 
purchaser, having paid the monopoly price in the initial purchase, is 
then free to transfer the product without violating what would be 
included, on a literal reading of the statute, within the patent owner’s 
exclusive right to sell. 
The second exclusive right that a patent confers is the exclusive right 
to manufacture products incorporating the patented technology.120  The 
repair/reconstruction doctrine, as first enunciated in 1945 by Learned 
Hand,121 recognizes again that the patent owner obtains the benefit of 
the patent monopoly when a patented product is first sold, and the 
purchaser is permitted to repair the patented product without violating 
what would be included, on a literal reading, within the exclusive right 
to manufacture.122  Even replacement of individual unpatented parts, 
one at a time, whether of the same part repeatedly or different parts 
successively, is no more than the lawful right of the owner to repair his 
property.123 
In effect, these two judicial doctrines permit the owner of a patented 
product to extend the useful life of the product.  The same policy would 
lead to the conclusion that a product that needed to be transferred to a 
new platform because of technological obsolescence should not 
constitute patent infringement—in both cases, the underlying, protected 
technology would continue to function but for the failure of an 
unprotected component.124 
B.  The Federal Copyright Statute: Rights and Exceptions 
U.S. copyright law may be traced back to the common law of 
England and the English Statute of 1710, which secured to authors the 
sole right of publication for designated periods.125  Colonial authors were 
protected by common law, which protected the rights of authors until 
 
119. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
120. Id. § 271(c). 
121. “The [patent] monopolist cannot prevent those to whom he sells from . . . 
reconditioning articles worn by use, unless they in fact make a new article.”  United States v. 
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1945). 
122. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961). 
123. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 425. 
124. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. 
125. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 656 (1834). 
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publication,126 and in some states by statute, which remained the sole 
source of copyright protection under the Articles of Confederation.127 
The Intellectual Property Clause gave Congress the power to create 
federal copyrights, and that power is exercised in Title 17 of the U.S. 
Code.128  Regulations governing the Copyright Office and processing 
copyright registration are contained in Title 37 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations.129  Federal copyright coexisted with common law copyright 
in unpublished works until 1976 when Congress extended federal 
statutory copyright to unpublished works and preempted common law 
rights.130  The current copyright statute protects works of authorship as 
soon as the work is fixed in a tangible medium,131 so it is technically not 
necessary for the author to put the public in possession of the work in 
order to create a copyright.132  The practicalities of proving infringement, 
however, make it necessary for the author to surrender any trade secrets 
by publication of the artistic work133 in exchange for the exclusive rights 
of copyright protection.134 
1.  Providing the Required Time-Limited Incentive 
A copyright gives its owner the right to stop others from 
reproducing, distributing, performing, displaying, or creating derivative 
works from the protected work135 for a period that depends on the date 
 
126. The Court in Wheaton, held that common law protection did not extend to works 
once they had been published. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591.  U.S. copyright statutes likewise preserved 
common law copyright rights in unpublished works until 1976 when statutory coverage was 
extended to unpublished works and contrary state laws were preempted.  17 U.S.C. § 301 
(2006);  Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
127. See discussion supra note 7. 
128. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006). 
129. Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.1–501.11 (2009).  
130. 17 U.S.C. § 301.  Unpublished works already in existence before January 1, 1978, 
are treated separately.  See 17 U.S.C. § 303. 
131. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
132. The author could fix a work (thereby creating a copyright) but not publish it.  
Student notes, assuming they are not literal transcriptions of a lecture, would be an example. 
133. This disclosure satisfies the requirement of the preamble of the Intellectual 
Property Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
134. This satisfies the requirement of the body of the Intellectual Property Clause.  The 
copyright owner’s control is exclusive (meaning the right to exclude) but not exhaustive—the 
copyright owner can only prevent others from reproducing, distributing, performing, 
displaying, or creating derivative works.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).  See discussion infra Part 
II.B.2. 
135. Subject to 107 through 122, the owner of copyright . . . has the exclusive rights to 
do and to authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
OPPENHEIMER FORMAT 5-17-10 5/26/2010  2:19 PM 
2010] “TECHNOLOGY-SHIFTING” RIGHTS 293 
 
of creation and the nature of the author.  “Anyone who violates any of 
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer”136 and is 
subject to injunctive relief,137 liability for damages that may include the 
copyright owner’s damages or, if greater, the infringer’s profits,138 
impoundment of infringing items,139 and, in appropriate cases, costs and 
attorneys fees.140 
2.  Furthering Progress 
As an exercise of Intellectual Property Clause power, the copyright 
statute must further progress.141  Its core purpose is “promoting broad 
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts”142 and like the 
patent statute, it accomplishes that purpose in two ways.  It does so 
directly by the incentive it offers to authors for creation, publication, 
and registration,143 and it does so indirectly by what it excludes from 
copyright protection, thereby protecting later innovators and the public 
by placing limits on the types of works which may be protected and 
limits on a copyright owner’s enforcement rights. 
 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by 
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, 
and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, 
and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a 
motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; 
and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by 
means of a digital audio transmission. 
17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(6). 
136. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). 
137. 17 U.S.C. § 502. 
138. 17 U.S.C. § 504.  The copyright statute also provides for statutory damages—fixed 
sums that a court may award for infringement without proof of actual damages.  17 U.S.C. § 
504(c). 
139. 17 U.S.C. § 503. 
140. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006). 
141. Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 328 (1859); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. 
v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152–53 (1950). 
142. Fogarty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526 (1994) (quoting Twentieth Century 
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). 
143. Copyright attaches to a work upon mere fixation in a tangible medium.  There are, 
however, benefits to registration, including access to federal courts (the only courts with 
jurisdiction to hear copyright infringement cases) and enhanced damages. 
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a.  Disclosure 
Technically, the copyright statute does not require disclosure of a 
work in order to create a copyright.144  A copyright “subsists” in any 
original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium.145  Originality is 
a constitutional requirement, although the threshold of creativity 
required to meet this requirement is low.146  Enforcement, however, 
requires access to federal courts, and a jurisdictional requirement is 
registration.147  Registration is required in order to enforce a copyright, 
but even registration (which requires that a filing becomes publicly 
available148 with the Copyright Office) falls far short of “promoting 
broad public availability” and does not even require disclosure of the 
work itself in all cases.149  The Copyright Office only reviews the 
application for completeness and to determine whether the work is a 
“work of authorship.”  There is no substantive review to determine if it 
is similar to, or might infringe, previously registered works.150  However, 
since the only acts constituting infringement are reproducing, 
 
144. Formal requirements for copyrights, such as publication with a notice of copyright 
or registration of a claim to copyright, are prohibited by the Berne Convention. Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886).  Prior to accession to 
the Berne Convention, the U.S. copyright statute did require publication with a copyright 
notice as a prerequisite to the existence of federal copyright and provided for loss of 
copyright if a work were published without the required notice. 
145. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
146. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (holding that 
the white pages of a telephone directory did not meet the standard of creativity to qualify for 
copyright protection).  
To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author. . . . 
Original[ity], as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was 
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and 
that it possesses . . . some minimal degree of creativity. . . . To be sure, the requisite 
level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.  
Id. 
147. “[N]o . . . action for infringement of the copyright . . . shall be instituted until . . . 
registration of the copyright claim has been made . . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006). 
148. The registration materials are available to the public in the sense that they may be 
viewed at the Library of Congress.  They are not posted on a web site nor may the public 
make copies of the work itself; this would be a violation of the copyright owner’s exclusive 
rights.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
149. The Copyright Office has the right to request copies of certain works, but the 
registration form does not require that all works be included with registration.  See U.S. 
Copyright Office Form TX (registration of textual works), Form VA (registration of visual 
works) and Form SR (registration of sound recordings). 
150. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884) (“Our copyright 
system has no . . . provision for previous examination by a proper tribunal as to . . . 
originality . . . .”). 
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distributing, performing, displaying, or creating derivatives of the 
copyrighted work,151 a work cannot be infringed if it has been disclosed 
to no one.152 
b.  Reservations: Fair Use and Sections 107–122 
Other than the requirements of originality and authorship, there are 
no restrictions on the types of works that may be copyrighted.153  There 
is no mechanism comparable to those provided by the patent statute154 
to assure that only one copyright is granted with respect to similar 
works.155  Thus, it is theoretically possible to face allegations of copyright 
infringement from multiple plaintiffs with respect to the same act. 
The risk of stifling innovation is reduced in three ways: by the 
definition of infringement itself, by specific statutory exceptions to a 
copyright owner’s rights, and by judicially created limits on a copyright 
owner’s rights. 
The definition of infringement requires an act related to the 
copyright owner’s work—“facts are not copyrightable”156 nor is 
independent creation of a work, no matter how similar to the 
copyrighted work, an act of infringement. 
Even as to a copyrightable work, which is the basis of the alleged 
infringer’s acts, certain activities are permitted.  The rights granted by 
17 U.S.C. § 106 are all “[s]ubject to sections 107 through 122 . . . .”157  In 
brief summary, § 107 codifies the fair use defense,158 § 108 provides 
 
151. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). 
152. Copyright infringement does not extend to the underlying ideas in a copyrighted 
work, nor does it extend to independently created works, which are similar to a copyrighted 
work. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991) (“[F]acts are not 
copyrightable . . . .”).  Therefore, it is, as a practical matter, necessary to put the public in 
possession of the work in order to establish infringement. 
153. Earlier copyright statutes were specific as to types of works that were 
copyrightable.  The list expanded as new technologies emerged, and the current statute 
provides that “[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a 
machine or device.”  17 U.S.C. § 102(a).  The statute then enumerates a list of categories, 
which are included within the definition of “works of authorship,” but the list is not exclusive. 
154. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
155. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 111 U.S. at 59  (“Our copyright system has no . . . 
provision for previous examination by a proper tribunal as to . . . originality . . . .”). 
156. Feist, 499 U.S. at 344. 
157. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
158. 17 U.S.C. § 107, discussed in detail infra note 169. 
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exceptions for certain library activities,159 § 109 authorizes resale of a 
copyrighted work,160 § 110 authorizes certain educational uses of 
copyrighted works,161 §§ 111, 112, 114, 119, and 122 authorize certain 
uses by broadcasters,162 § 113 authorizes photographs of physical objects 
incorporating copyrighted works,163 § 115 provides for compulsory 
licenses to “cover” previously released music,164 § 117 protects certain 
uses of computer software,165 § 118 establishes a mechanism for 
compulsory licenses at fixed royalties for certain uses of copyrighted 
works,166 § 120 authorizes photographs of architectural works,167 and § 
121 provides for certain reproductions for use by the blind and other 
people with disabilities.168 
The most widely used exception to copyright enforcement is the fair 
use defense of 17 U.S.C. § 107.169  The statute lays out the factors to be 
considered in determining whether a use is fair or not, and several 
 
159. 17 U.S.C. § 108. 
160. 17 U.S.C. § 109. 
161. 17 U.S.C. § 110. 
162. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111 (cable systems), 112 (broadcasters), 114 (radio), 119 (secondary 
television transmissions), and 122 (satellite). 
163. 17 U.S.C. § 113 (2006). 
164. 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
165. 17 U.S.C. § 117, discussed in detail infra note 187. 
166. 17 U.S.C. § 118(b)(4). 
167. 17 U.S.C. § 120(a). 
168. 17 U.S.C. § 121. 
169. The doctrine was recognized before it was incorporated in the statute in Folsom v. 
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), where Justice Story held it an infringement to copy 
319 of the 7,000 pages from Writings of President Washington but noted that “[i]f it had been 
the case of a fair and bona fide abridgement of the work of the plaintiffs, it might have 
admitted of a very different consideration.”  Id. at 349.  As discussed infra note 246, the fair 
use exception is not as extensive as commonly believed, and is limited to specific types of 
uses.  The statute provides: 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use 
the factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such 
finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  As argued in discussion infra Part V.A, this is an area that Congress 
could amend to deal with the technology-shifting problem. 
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principles have been established in judicial decisions: 
1. Although the statute directs attention to whether the use is 
commercial or nonprofit, this factor is not determinative.170  Commercial 
uses are presumed unfair171 but the converse is not true—even a 
nonprofit use may constitute infringement. 
2.  The nature of the work typically distinguishes between fiction and 
non-fiction, with works of fiction entitled to more protection than non-
fiction.172 
3.  Transformative uses173 are more likely to constitute fair use174 and 
the more transformative a use is, the less significant the other factors are 
in the analysis.175  Even use of an entire unaltered work could 
theoretically be transformative enough to satisfy fair use.176  Use for 
criticism and parody receive special consideration, in light of First 
Amendment concerns.177 
4.  The effect on the potential market for the work has been argued 
to be the most important element in fair use analysis.178 
While the fair use defense is available in appropriate cases, the fact-
specificity of the analysis prompted the Second Circuit to characterize 
the doctrine as “the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright,”179 
making it dangerous to rely on as a defense. 
Section 117 carves out exceptions in the specific area of computer 
software and is discussed in detail at note 187, infra. 
Finally, while 17 U.S.C. § 106 grants an exclusive right of 
distribution, the judicially created “first sale” doctrine provides that, 
once a copyright owner has placed a copy in commerce, the lawful 
owner of that copy may display, resell, or otherwise transfer it.180 
 
170. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985). 
171. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984). 
172. Bond v. Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 395 (4th Cir. 2003). 
173. A use is transformative if it uses a work in a different manner or for a different 
purpose.  Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1105, 1111 (1990). 
174. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 577–78; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 
2007).
 177. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1274 n.28 (11th Cir. 2001). 
178. NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 482 (2d Cir. 2004); Leval, supra note 
173, at 1124. 
179. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). 
180. United States v. Drebin, 557 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Atherton, 
561 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1977).  The first sale doctrine is a defense to infringement based on 
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C.  Trademarks 
Trademarks are often treated as a third category of intellectual 
property rights,181 and are included here for completeness, but 
trademarks are not enabled by the Intellectual Property Clause and do 
not pose the same risk of impeding innovation by increasing early 
adopters’ costs as do patents and copyrights. 
 The Trade-Mark Cases182 held that the Intellectual Property 
Clause could not support a federal trademark statute since trademarks 
were neither inventions nor works of authorship.183  More fundamentally, 
trademarks also differ from copyrights and patents in that trademarks 
cannot be created without public disclosure, while the underlying 
philosophy of the Intellectual Property Clause is to motivate disclosure 
of what may otherwise be maintained as a trade secret.  An inventor or 
an author has the choice to profit from innovation without making it 
public; a trademark owner has no choice but to make the trademark 
 
the exclusive distribution right, not a general defense to infringement.  For example, 
purchasing an embodiment of a copyrighted work does not confer the right to create an 
adaptation of that work.  See Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d 
1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988).  The statute provides:  
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [which grants the copyright owner 
the exclusive right to distribute], the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord 
lawfully made . . . or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the 
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of 
that copy or phonorecord, 
 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006), and  
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106(5) [which grants the copyright owner 
the exclusive right to display publicly], the owner of a particular copy lawfully made 
. . . or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the 
copyright owner, to display that copy publicly . . . .   
17 U.S.C. § 109(c). 
181. Trademarks may be considered intellectual property in the sense that they relate 
to an intangible right and relate to a product of the mind.  In Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 
(1879), the Supreme Court distinguished trademarks from copyrights and patents on the basis 
that trademarks were not considered creative. Id. While many modern trademarks exhibit 
significant artistic creativity, there is no requirement that a trademark be creative.  In fact, 
trademarks may be obtained on ordinary words with no design and no particular typeface if 
the mark is shown to have acquired secondary meaning—association in the minds of 
consumers with a particular source of goods or services.
 182. Id. 
183. Id. at 93–94.  The argument that the statute was a constitutional exercise of 
Commerce Clause power also failed.  The Court found no expression of congressional intent 
to act pursuant to Commerce Clause powers in the legislative history and also held that the 
legislation went beyond regulation of federal commerce (under the 1879 interpretation of 
interstate commerce).  Id. at 97–98.  Subsequently, Congress created a trademark registration 
system, limited to federal commerce, under the Commerce Clause.  Trademark Act of 1946 
(Lanham Act), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427–46 (1946) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141). 
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public in order to obtain trademark status184 and therefore no motivation 
to disclose is required. 
III.  THE UNBALANCING EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGICAL ACCELERATION 
A goal of the Intellectual Property Clause is technological progress.  
If successful, this results in new technologies displacing old technologies 
and the obsolescence of the old technology.  The acceleration of 
technological change, particularly in the converging fields of computer 
software, music, video, television, and communications, coupled with 
the time required for industry standards to emerge and the power of 
technology industry lobbies has left the balance tilted in favor of 
rewarding innovators at the expense of further innovation and of 
consumers. 
Congress recognized the issue in the 1970s in the context of the 
emergence of personal computers and created the National Commission 
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”), which 
it directed to review the emerging technology of personal computer 
software and recommend changes to the copyright statute.185  CONTU 
reported: 
 
Because of a lack of complete standardization among 
programming languages and hardware in the computer industry, 
one who rightfully acquires a copy of a program frequently 
cannot use it without adapting it to that limited extent which will 
allow its use in the possessor’s computer.  The copyright law, 
which grants to copyright proprietors the exclusive right to 
prepare translations, transformations, and adaptations of their 
work, should no more prevent such use than it should prevent 
rightful possessors from loading programs into their computers.  
Thus, a right to make those changes necessary to enable the use 
for which it was both sold and purchased should be provided.  
The conversion of a program . . . to facilitate use would fall 
within this right, as would the right to add features to the 
program that were not present at the time of rightful 
 
184. 15 U.S.C. § 1111. 
185. CONTU was created by Congress “to assist the President and Congress in 
developing a national policy for both protecting the rights of copyright owners and ensuring 
public access to copyrighted works when they are used in computer and machine duplication 
systems, bearing in mind the public and consumer interest.”  NAT’L COMM. ON NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL, FINAL REPORT 3 (July 31, 1978) 
[hereinafter CONTU FINAL REPORT]. 
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acquisition.186 
 
 In response to the report, Congress enacted § 117 of the copyright 
statute in almost the identical language recommended by CONTU187 and 
thereby, in the specific context of computer software, intended to be 
used on a machine which potentially could become obsolete while the 
software remained useful, Congress effectively authorized the purchaser 
of the software to avoid technological obsolescence by adapting the 
software to a different machine.188 
The issue addressed by Congress and CONTU goes beyond 
computer software and more generally applies to emerging 
technologies, especially when rapid development of a technology is 
associated with a lack of standardization.  Computer technology was the 
first recognized instance of a rapidly developing field, broadly marketed 
to consumers, with competing standards that threatened to render early 
 
186. Id. at 13. 
187. The Commission’s proposed statutory changes were enacted almost verbatim.  
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 2 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6461–62.  See 
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983) (“[W]e 
can consider the CONTU Report as accepted by Congress since Congress wrote into law the 
majority’s recommendations almost verbatim.”).  As enacted, 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2006) 
provides: 
Limitation on exclusive rights: computer programs 
(a) Making of additional copy or adaptation by owner of copy.—Notwithstanding 
the provisions of 106, it is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer 
program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that 
computer program provided: 
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the 
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is 
used in no other manner, or 
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all 
archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the 
computer program should cease to be rightful. 
(b) Lease, sale, or other transfer of additional copy or adaptation.—Any exact 
copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section may be leased, 
sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such copies were 
prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the program. 
Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of the 
copyright owner.  
17 U.S.C. § 117(a)–(b) (2006).  The one change is from the Commission’s recommended 
“rightful possessor” to “owner” in the introductory phrase of 117(a)(2). Cf. CONTU 
FINAL REPORT, supra note 185, at 12 with 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(2). 
188. Adapting a computer program (in copyright terms, creating a derivative work) to 
run under a newer operating system does not constitute copyright infringement.  Aymes v. 
Bonelli, 47 F.3d 23, 26–27 (2d Cir. 1995); Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 125–29 (2d 
Cir. 2005). 
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purchases obsolete and unusable.  The problem, however, is the same in 
any field meeting those criteria. 
IV.  THE ROLE OF THE CONSUMER IN PROMOTING PROGRESS (EARLY 
ADOPTERS) 
The Intellectual Property Clause authorizes Congress to promote 
progress by granting certain rights to innovators—authors and 
inventors.  Because of the specific mention of authors and inventors in 
the enabling clause, it is not surprising that congressional attention has 
focused on their rights to a greater degree than those of competitors and 
consumers.  As discussed above,189 Congress has enacted specific 
exemptions to both the copyright and patent statutes in order to protect 
specific activities, but it has been the courts that have recognized 
general exemptions. 
Overly broad intellectual property rights injure competitors.  
Fundamental blocking190 of intellectual property rights may prevent 
competitors from entering a field, thereby slowing innovation by forcing 
competitors to work around the protected technology (which delays 
emergence of industry standards) or wait until the blocking rights in the 
technology expire (which, in the case of copyrights, extends beyond the 
original author’s lifetime). 
This blocking phenomenon has a secondary effect on consumers, 
especially on a particularly valuable and vulnerable class of consumers 
known as “early adopters,” consumers who purchase early stage 
technology before an industry standard is established,191 and in turn has 
an effect on innovators as well. 
Because intellectual property law provides no direct reward for 
innovation but relies instead on profits made in the marketplace as the 
incentive,192 advancing progress requires more than the innovative 
idea—it also requires the funding necessary to develop the idea into a 
commercial product and funding depends on investors’ evaluations of 
the likelihood that the product is likely to succeed.  Innovation is 
 
189. See discussion supra Part I.
 190. A “blocking” right is one that prevents a potential competitor from incorporating 
a particular, desirable, feature in a product. 
191. Recent examples of early adopters would include buyers of Radio Shack’s Tandy 
computer, Sony’s Betamax videorecorder or Toshiba’s HDD high-definition DVD players. 
192. “[M]onopolies . . . are granted for certain years to ingenious discoveries in 
countries, and more necessary in this, as the government has no resources to reward 
extraordinary merit.”  Remarks on the Amendments to the Federal Constitution, 6 American 
Museum or Repository of Ancient and Modern Fugitive Pieces 303 (1789). 
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important, but not sufficient.  For example, more than 7.5 million 
patents have been issued, and more than 33 million copyrights have 
been registered.193  However, only a small percentage even recover the 
cost of obtaining the patent or copyright.  Estimates of success rates 
vary widely, but all estimates are low.  In 2005, the Patent Office 
estimated the odds of profiting from a patent at 1 in 500: “[O]dds are 
stacked astronomically against inventors. . . . There are around 1.5 
million patents in effect . . . and of those, maybe 3,000 are commercially 
viable . . . .”194  In 2000, the Patent Office had estimated the odds of 
commercial success at 1 in 50.195  The U.S. Small Business 
Administration estimates that only 5% of patents result in products and 
of those, 50% to 80% fail.196  Speculation on the success rate of 
inventions is a perennial sport, and some popular press reports put the 
odds of success as high as 5%197 or as low as 0.02%.198 
Early adopters contribute significantly to the ultimate success or 
failure of new technologies.  Early adopters are particularly important 
in the field of computers (and computer-based systems) because in 
order for an operating system to be commercially successful, there need 
to be applications available that will motivate users to purchase the 
system; programmers, motivated by the desire for sales, tend to write for 
operating systems that have a large user base.  Thus, systems which 
attract a critical mass of early users build momentum, attracting more 
programmers writing more applications, thus making the system 
attractive to a larger group of purchasers.199  The early adopters are 
 
193. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 72; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
supra note 73, at 58.  The copyright registration number understates the number of copyrights 
created, since registration has not been required, except as a prerequisite to litigation, since 
1968.  17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2006). 
194. Karen E. Klein, Avoiding the Inventor’s Lament, BUS. WK., Nov. 10, 2005, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/nov2005/sb20051109_124661.htm 
(quoting Richard Maulsby, director of public affairs for the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office). 
195. Susan Glairon, Inventors Find Joy in Journey from Idea to Product, TRIB. 
BUSINESS NEWS, Apr. 17, 2000. 
196. Barbara Bradley, San Jose Mercury News, Feb. 18, 1990, p. 1 PC. 
197. Tim Lemke, Invention + Market Savvy = Successful Product, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 
16, 2001, at D8; Caryne Brown, Making Money Making Toys, BLACK ENTER., Nov. 1993, at 
68. 
198. “[E]xperts estimate that 1 out of 5,000 inventions have gone on to successful 
product launches.”  Bevolyn Williams-Harold, You’ve Got It Made!, BLACK ENTER., June 
1999, at 259–60. 
199. The same pattern applies to the entertainment field as well.  By contemporary 
accounts, the Sony Betamax was technically superior to VHS, but more prerecorded videos 
were made available on VHS than on Beta, making the VHS machines of greater value to 
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vulnerable because they must invest not only in the early stage 
technology but also in the time and effort required to make use of, and 
build systems around, the technology before it has been fully tested by 
large groups of users.  They also risk losing their investment if a 
different technology prevails as the industry standard, rendering their 
choice obsolete.  Examples would include libraries of Beta format 
videotapes or HDD format DVDs, neither of which can be played on 
current production machines. 
Even assuming that Congress were to conclude that the sole 
measure of meeting the constitutional objective of furthering progress 
was the extent to which intellectual property laws rewarded innovators, 
in order for the innovators to obtain the indirect incentive of limited-
term monopoly profits, market acceptance is necessary.  Early adopters 
are an important factor in whether a product succeeds in the 
marketplace and therefore early adopters play a critical role in 
promoting progress.  Innovators benefit200 when consumers adopt 
innovative (and unproven) technology.  Early adopters, in turn, can 
more safely purchase and invest the time and resources necessary to 
implement early stage technology if they can be assured that their 
investment will be protected by being transferrable to a competing 
technology that prevails as the industry standard.  In addition, since the 
general pattern of technology pricing is for prices to drop over time, 
early adopters overpay with respect to late followers.  Therefore, a 
rational early adopter would weigh the increased price against the value 
of early access to the technology.  To the extent the risk of early 
adoption is reduced, early adopters should be more willing to invest in 
early stage technology, thereby furthering the goal of promoting 
progress. 
It would be reasonable to ask why, if the interests of consumers in 
general and early adopters in particular are so important to the 
 
consumers since they provided a greater selection of movies.  Ultimately, VHS was the more 
successful format and became the industry standard, forcing Sony to abandon its Betamax 
machine and begin producing VHS machines.  More recently, Sony’s BluRay and Toshiba’s 
HDD high definition DVDs created a competition between these two standard-bearers to 
enlist content producers to license their works.  When Toshiba lost that competition, it 
abandoned its HDD format. 
200. The mere fact that infringement provides an incidental benefit to the copyright 
holder is generally not a defense to infringement.  Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. 
Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1980).  Here, however, the argument is not that 
early adopters should have a defense to an infringement action under the current statute, but 
rather that the statute should recognize their role in promoting progress and provide a 
statutory defense. 
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objective of progress, the Constitution failed to include any explicit 
provision recognizing their interests.  There are several possible 
answers, although as noted above,201 all are speculation.  It is arguable 
that the preamble to the Intellectual Property Clause is in effect a public 
domain provision designed to protect consumers by requiring that in 
granting rights to authors and inventors Congress take the goal of 
promoting progress into account.  It is also possible that the Framers 
expected that the “limited times” provision of the Intellectual Property 
Clause was a sufficient protection and it assumed that future Congresses 
would stay close to the terms of protection that were then in effect in 
the colonies and England—approximately fourteen years—especially 
given the comparatively slow pace of technological innovation at the 
time.  The first Congress’s adoption of comparable time periods for 
protection may be considered persuasive evidence of constitutional 
intent.202  Finally, it should be remembered that words were considerably 
more expensive in the eighteenth century than they are today, both in 
terms of the cost to produce and the cost to copy.  Thus, the better 
question might be not why no Public Domain Clause was included, but 
rather why an Intellectual Property Clause was included,203 particularly 
when the philosophy of the Constitution was “[t]o insert essential 
principles only, lest the operations of government should be clogged by 
rendering those provisions permanent and unalterable, which ought to 
be accommodated to times and events.”204  One explanation may be that 
the purpose was to assure that exclusive rights were only granted to 
promote progress rather than as the political rewards that had been 
common in England.205  Another explanation that has been offered is 
that the purpose of including the clause was “not so much as an express 
authority to promote the progress of science and the useful arts, but 
rather as a means of ensuring authority to do so in a particular way, 
namely, by securing exclusive rights for limited times . . . .”206 
 
201. See discussion supra Part IV. 
202. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 980 (1991) (“The actions of the First 
Congress . . . are of course persuasive evidence of what the Constitution means . . . .”). 
203. Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 26. 
204. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 22, at 137 
(quoting Edmund Randolph).  See also Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938) 
(when interpreting the Constitution, it is presumed “that no word was unnecessarily used, or 
needlessly added”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be 
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect . . . .”). 
205. See discussion supra Part I. 
206. Walterscheid, supra note 2, at 33. 
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Regardless of the explanation, it is clear that the clause was written 
against an anti-monopoly background207 and that its objective was to 
promote progress with rewards to innovators a secondary consequence 
rather than the objective.208 
V.  CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL BALANCE POINTS 
A.  Congress’s Balance 
Congress’s only tool under the Intellectual Property Clause is the 
grant of exclusive rights; “[i]t is Congress that has been assigned the task 
of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to 
authors . . . .”209  The “exclusive” rights, which Congress has the power to 
grant, are exclusive in the sense of “right to exclude” rather than “all-
inclusive rights.”  Thus, there is room to reward innovators with 
exclusive rights while still reserving to the public sufficient rights to 
guard against stifling further innovation.  In recent attempts to strike the 
balance, Congress has tended to focus on the motivation to innovate 
side of the balance and paid less attention to the impediment to 
innovation side, perhaps because innovators include well-funded 
lobbyists. 
This bias is understandable, even ignoring the influence of lobbying.  
It is hard to find an example of the technological obsolescence problem 
even as late as the last major copyright revision (1968).210  When 
Congress revamped the copyright statute in 1968, it did perceive the 
broad outlines of the problem with respect to the then-emerging 
personal computer industry, and responded with a “placeholder” 
provision in the statute.211  Prior to that, other technology 
transformations did not lend themselves to shifting to the new 
technology while preserving values that had been built under the old 
technology.  For example, when automobiles replaced horse drawn 
 
207. See discussion supra Part I. 
208. “The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are . . . [not] primarily 
designed to provide a special private benefit. . . . [They are ] intended to motivate the creative 
activity of authors and inventors . . .” Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
429 (1984). 
209. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 (2003) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 429).  It is 
also preferable that Congress, rather than the Courts, set the balance.  Statutes can provide 
greater uniformity, clarity, and completeness than judicial decisions. 
210. The last major patent statute revision was even earlier (1952).
 211. See discussion supra note 187.  The “placeholder” provision (17 U.S.C. § 117) 
remains in place more than forty years later. 
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carriages, not much of the carriage industry was prevented from 
transitioning to the automobile industry by patents or copyrights.  With 
the introduction of the phonograph, John Philip Sousa feared that the 
new technology would destroy the demand for live music,212 but those 
who had previously enjoyed live music had (by definition) no library of 
music that was trapped in the old technology by intellectual property 
rights.  More recently, in the movie studios’ views, Sony’s introduction 
of the Betamax videorecorder threatened the film industry213 but again 
Betamax owners had no pre-existing libraries to transfer. 
Congress has provided situation-specific exceptions to the general 
rights of copyright holders.214  For example, while 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) 
secures the exclusive right “to distribute copies or phonorecords,” 17 
U.S.C. § 109 permits the lawful owner of an embodiment of a 
copyrighted work to transfer that copy.  Specific institutions—
libraries,215 schools,216 broadcasters,217 and the music industry218—are at 
least partially insulated from copyright infringement liability.  More 
broadly, although not as broadly as popularly believed, Congress 
codified a fair use defense.219  
Weighing against these specific exemptions, however, is the dramatic 
expansion of the term of copyright.  Under the Berne Convention,220 the 
United States was required to provide copyright protection for a 
minimum term of the life of the author plus fifty years.221  Congress 
 
212. “John Philip Sousa predicted that recordings would lead to the demise of music.  
The phonograph, he warned . . . [would] put professional musicians out of work.”  Alex Ross, 
The Record Effect: How Technology Has Transformed the Sound of Music, THE NEW 
YORKER, June 6, 2005, at 94. 
213. Reply Brief for the Petitioners, Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417 (1984) (No. 81-1687).  Ironically (and arguably confirming the validity of the 
Founders’ faith in the free market system to “promote progress”), Sony now is a major 
motion picture producer; and videotapes and DVDs account for more of its revenues than do 
theatrical releases. 
214. The general rights are provided in 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
215. 17 U.S.C. § 108. 
216. 17 U.S.C. § 110. 
217. 17 U.S.C. §§ 111 (cable systems), 112 (broadcasters), 114 (radio), 119 (secondary 
television transmissions), and 122 (satellite). 
218. 17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 118. 
219. 17 U.S.C. § 107, discussed in detail supra note 169. 
220. Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886) entered into 
force in the United States on March 1, 1989.  Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 
Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988). 
221. Retroactivity is not required by the Berne Convention and not all countries made 
the extension retroactive. 
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passed implementing legislation and justified the extensions as follows: 
 
The purpose of the bill is to ensure adequate copyright 
protection for American works in foreign nations and the 
continued economic benefits of a healthy surplus balance of 
trade in the exploitation of copyrighted works.  The bill 
accomplishes these goals by extending the current U.S. copyright 
term for an additional 20 years.  Such an extension will provide 
significant trade benefits by . . . ensuring fair compensation for 
American creators who deserve to benefit fully from the 
exploitation of their works.  Moreover, by stimulating the 
creation of new works and providing enhanced economic 
incentives to preserve existing works, such an extension will 
enhance the long-term volume, vitality, and accessibility of the 
public domain.222 
 
Supporters argued that the extension was necessary because life 
expectancy had risen dramatically since 1790 when the first copyright 
act (setting a fourteen-year term and one fourteen-year renewal term) 
was passed.223  However, nothing in the Constitution or the adoption 
debates provides any support for the notion that copyright terms should 
be based on the author’s lifespan, and patents, which arise under the 
same clause, have had approximately the same fixed term throughout 
the history of the Constitution.  Some supporters felt the term extension 
did not go far enough in rewarding authors.  Congresswoman Mary 
Bono wanted a perpetual term but was “informed by staff that such a 
change would violate the Constitution” and suggested considering Jack 
Valenti’s224 proposal for a term of “forever less one day.”225  The courts 
have uniformly held, however, that “[t]he monopoly privileges that 
Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to 
provide a special private benefit. . . . [They are] intended to motivate the 
creative activity of authors and inventors . . . and to allow the public 
access to the products of their genius after the limited period of 
exclusive control has expired.”226  Supporters therefore also argued that 
a dramatic extension of copyright term would result in more works 
 
222. S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 3 (1996). 
223. 144 CONG. REC. S12377 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch on the 
passage of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act).
 224. Jack Valenti was president of the Motion Picture Association of America. 
225. 144 CONG. REC. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998). 
226. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
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being made available to the public.  Interestingly, though, Disney’s 
response to the extended term of protection was to adopt precisely the 
opposite strategy, taking existing works off the market, offering them 
for limited times then placing them “tucked [away] in the vault.”227 
The 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act228 extended 
the term of existing and future copyrights by approximately twenty 
years.  Given the current rate of technological advance, it is unlikely 
that any current method for distributing data other than paper will still 
be available when today’s copyrights expire.  The act was challenged as 
violating the constitutional limits of Congress’s authority in the 
intellectual property field, but upheld in Eldred v. Ashcroft..229  As 
Justice Stevens pointed out, in the eighty years preceding the Eldred 
decision, only one year’s worth of copyrighted material had fallen into 
the public domain.230 
In addition to extending the term of copyright, Congress took 
additional steps to protect content providers.  The Audio Home 
Recording Act of 1992 (“AHRA”) was enacted to deal with the 
perceived threat of digital audio recording technology, which permitted 
repeated reproduction of music files without significant loss of sound 
quality.  The AHRA requires that devices capable of making digital 
copies of music incorporate copy controls,231 and imposes royalties on 
manufacturers, distributors, and importers of such devices and the 
media used for digital copying.232  In exchange, the Act exempts 
noncommercial consumer copying of music from copyright 
infringement.233  Note that the activities protected by AHRA are 
 
227. Thomas K. Arnold, ‘Bambi’ is Back—for 70 ‘II’ Days, USAToday.com (Feb. 6, 
2006), http://www.usatoday.com/life/movies/news/2006-02-06-bambi_x.htm (noting that at the 
time thirty films were scheduled for re-release moratorium and that the strategy allowed 
maintaining prices—“[i]f you keep it on the shelves, the only option you have is to keep 
repricing it, lower and lower.”); Robert La Franco, Eisner’s Bumpy Ride, FORBES, July 5, 
1999, at 50; Vaulting the Disney Gap and Its Plan for Profits, DailyTrojan.com, Jan. 25, 2005, 
http://dailytrojan.com/?s=Vaulting+the+Disney+Gap+and+its+Plan+for+Profits (“Walt 
Disney Company seeks to drive up the demand for their supposed ‘limited’ amount of discs”; 
noting that MGM followed a similar strategy with its James Bond films). 
228. Pub. L. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (upheld by Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 
(2003)).
 229. 537 U.S. 186.  The case was initially filed against Attorney General Janet Reno, 
but her successor John Ashcroft was substituted. 
230. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
231. 17 U.S.C. § 1002 (2006). 
232. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003–1005. 
233. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 provides:  
No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based 
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broader than the right of technology-shifting; the AHRA protects what 
would otherwise be an infringement of copyright by someone who has 
not even acquired ownership of the work in an earlier technological 
form. 
Finally, under the authority of the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) treaty, Congress passed an anti-
bootlegging criminal statute prohibiting recording or distribution of live 
musical performances for commercial advantage or private financial 
gain.234 
B.  The Courts’ Balance 
1.  Deference to Congressional Balancing 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that “the powers of 
Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by the terms 
of the Constitution, and as there are no restraints on its exercise, there 
can be no limitation of their right to modify them at their pleasure”235 
and that, so long as the term of exclusive rights is only for a limited 
period, it may even extend the duration of existing copyrights and 
patents.236  Courts have been extremely deferential to the term of 
protection that Congress chooses when striking the appropriate 
balance.237 
 
on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio recording device, 
a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog 
recording medium, or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a 
device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical 
recordings.   
The main purpose of this section was “to ensure the right of consumers to make analog or 
digital audio recordings of copyrighted music for their private, noncommercial use.”  
Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 
1999) (emphasis in original) (quoting S. REP. 102-294 at 86 (1992)).
 234. 18 U.S.C. § 2319A (2006).  To date, court decisions on the application of the act 
have split.  See discussion infra Part V.B. 
235. McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843). 
236. Evans v. Jordan, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199, 204 (1815); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 
U.S. (14 How.) 539, 552–54 (1852); Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 340, 349–52 (1864); 
Eunson v. Dodge, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 414, 417 (1873).  The CTEA included retroactive 
provisions, extending the term of copyrights in works that had already been created, which 
were upheld in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
237. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 256–57 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (holding the CTEA twenty-year 
extension of copyright for works already in existence constitutional despite Justice Breyer’s 
demonstration that the term was nearly unlimited from a discounted cash value perspective). 
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2.  Judicial Independent Judgment 
Although the courts have deferred to Congress’s judgment on the 
question of appropriate terms of protection, the Intellectual Property 
Clause “is both a grant of power and a limitation . . . [and] Congress . . . 
may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional 
purpose.”238  Congress’s power, even if plenary, is still limited by the 
Constitution, as recognized in both Graham v. John Deere Co. and 
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.239 
Copyright and patent laws are distinct implementations of the 
Intellectual Property Clause, but their common ancestry explains broad 
similarities between the two areas of law.240  Both grant monopoly rights, 
in each case as an unavoidable consequence of the primary goal of 
providing benefits to the public rather than primarily for the benefit of 
authors or inventors.  In each area, early judicial decisions established 
areas which were exempt from the monopoly.241  The Supreme Court 
sees each as a source of guidance in the other.242 
 
238. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966). 
239. In Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989), the Court 
held that the preamble limited congressional power and that Congress could not remove 
technology from the public domain because doing so would thwart the constitutional 
mandate to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.  Further, as this Court has 
held, in light of the limitations built into “[t]he Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between 
the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle competition 
without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”  Id. at 146.  In 
Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6, the Court held that:  
[I]t must be remembered that the federal patent power stems from a specific 
constitutional provision which authorizes the Congress ‘To promote the Progress of 
. . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their . . . Discoveries.’  Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  The clause is both a grant of power and a 
limitation. . . . The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach 
the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional purpose.  Nor may it enlarge the 
patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit 
gained thereby.  Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents 
whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to 
restrict free access to materials already available. 
240. Both involve the grant of a limited monopoly: a patent owner has a set of 
exclusive rights, set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006), similar to those of a copyright owner, set 
forth in 17 U.S.C. § 106.  Both distinguish between the rights of the owner of the intellectual 
property right and the rights of the purchaser of a product embodying the intellectual 
property right.  Both have developed doctrines whereby the purchaser of a product 
embodying the intellectual property right obtains ownership of the product plus a license to 
use the embodied intellectual property with respect to that product. 
241. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 261 (1850). 
242. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).  
We recognize there are substantial differences between the patent and copyright 
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While deferring to Congress’s judgment in areas such as the term of 
protection, the courts have intervened in several important areas to 
protect the constitutional requirement that the protection furthers 
progress.  The current patent statute prohibits granting patents for 
obvious advances: 
 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not 
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of 
this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to 
be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a 
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was 
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said 
subject matter pertains. 243 
 
This section was not added to the statute until 1952.  The principle it 
codified, however, was announced by the Supreme Court in 1850244 as 
necessary to promote progress by keeping inventions that technically 
met the statutory requirement of novelty but were trivial modifications 
of existing technology from becoming patented and therefore impeding 
development of the field.  The courts have also read restrictions into the 
list of categories eligible for patent protection in order to preserve 
fundamental discoveries of laws of nature as an area open to all 
innovators.245 
In the copyright area, the Court has recognized that fair use is an 
 
laws.  But in both areas the contributory infringement doctrine is grounded on the 
recognition that adequate protection . . . may require the courts to look beyond 
actual duplication of a device or publication to the products or activities that make 
such duplication possible. 
Id.;  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (2006). 
243. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
244. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 261. 
245. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 
185 (1981). Although the Federal Circuit opined that:  
The Supreme Court has not been clear . . . as to whether such subject matter is 
excluded from the scope of § 101 because it represents laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, or abstract ideas. . . . The Supreme Court also has not been clear as to 
exactly what kind of mathematical subject matter may not be patented. The 
Supreme Court has used, among others, the terms “mathematical algorithm,” 
“mathematical formula,” and “mathematical equation” to describe types of 
mathematical subject matter not entitled to patent protection standing alone. The 
Supreme Court has not set forth, however, any consistent or clear explanation of 
what it intended by such terms or how these terms are related, if at all. 
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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exception from copyright rights, and that “time-shifting,” although 
resulting in what would otherwise be the making of an infringing copy, 
is likewise protected as required by the constitutional duty to promote 
progress.246 
The lower courts have recognized a similar exception for what has 
been referred to as “place-shifting” or “space-shifting.”247  In In re 
Aimster Copyright Litigation, the court noted a hypothetical list of 
activities, which would not be considered infringement, although they 
fall within the literal definition of the copyright statute.  Of particular 
interest, the court suggested: 
 
Someone might own a popular-music CD that he was particularly 
fond of, but he had not downloaded it into his computer and now 
he finds himself out of town but with his laptop and he wants to 
listen to the CD, so he uses Aimster’s service to download a 
copy. This might be a fair use rather than a copyright 
infringement, by analogy to the time-shifting approved as fair use 
in the Sony case.248 
 
In United States v. Martignon, a New York district court refused to 
enforce the anti-bootlegging statute249 and dismissed an indictment, 
holding the statute unconstitutional as violating two restrictions in the 
Intellectual Property Clause: granting protection for a work that had not 
been “fixed” (and was therefore not a “writing”) and avoiding the 
 
246. In Sony, it was shown that Sony knew its videotape recorder would, in addition to 
being used for playing home movies (which were not alleged to infringe plaintiffs’ 
copyrights), also be used for “time-shifting” (recording a television program for playback at a 
later time).  Sony, 464 U.S. at 423.  The Court held this time-shifting to be fair use, and 
therefore not an infringement of the copyright owners’ exclusive rights.  Id. at 442.  See also 
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (fair use exception); 
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (to invoke fair use 
exception).  
247. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 
(9th Cir. 1999); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 652 (7th Cir. 2003).  The Court 
characterizes the transfer in this hypothetical case as “fair use” by analogy to the time-shifting 
use in Sony.  An alternative route to the same result would be that it is a use within the 
implied license granted to the purchaser of the CD.  Yet, a third path would be to hold the 
hypothetical transfer protected by the AHRA, although that would place the decision in 
conflict with Recording Industries Ass’n. 
248. In re Aimster, 334 F.3d at 652. 
249. 18 U.S.C. § 2319(A) (2006), enacted pursuant to the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) treaty.  The statute proscribed the unauthorized 
recording or distribution of a live musical performance for commercial advantage or private 
financial gain. 
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limited times requirement.250  “Congress may not side-step the 
Copyright Clause’s limitations through legislating under the Commerce 
Clause.”251  In United States v. Moghadam, a defendant was convicted 
under the same statute252 although the Eleventh Circuit held the statute 
could not be supported by the Intellectual Property Clause253 and relied 
instead on the Commerce Clause as a source of authority.  
VI.  RESTORING THE BALANCE 
The courts have taken steps toward restoring the balance through 
recognition of time-shifting and place-shifting exceptions to copyright 
owners’ rights and repair exceptions to patent owners’ rights.  These 
are, however, merely pieces of the solution.  Furthermore, even though 
courts are recognizing user rights in these areas, there are transaction 
costs associated with vindicating specific rights through litigation.  Of 
particular concern, different rules have been applied to copyrights and 
patents.  While this posed little practical problem in the nineteenth 
century, the recent convergence of technology in the fields of computer 
software, communications, and media has blurred the lines between 
what is protected by patent and what is protected by copyright,254 and a 
single standard would provide needed clarity.  As argued above, 
reducing uncertainty reduces the cost to early adopters and therefore 
promotes progress.  What is now required to restore the balance is a 
generalized technology-shifting exception to the rights of intellectual 
property owners.  That exception would include at least four substantive 
 
250. 346 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
251. Id. at 426. 
252. 175 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). 
253. The court found the statute constitutional as within Congress’s authority under 
the Commerce Clause because it was “not fundamentally inconsistent with the fixation 
requirement of the Copyright Clause.”  Id. at 1281.  The Eleventh Circuit assumed “arguendo, 
without deciding, that the Commerce Clause could not be used to avoid a limitation in the 
Copyright Clause if the particular use of the Commerce Clause . . . were fundamentally 
inconsistent with the particular limitation in the Copyright Clause,” id. at 1280 n.12, but 
concluded that “extending quasi-copyright protection to unfixed live musical performances is 
in no way inconsistent with the Copyright Clause, even if that Clause itself does not directly 
authorize such protection.”  Id.  at 1280. 
254. Software companies once thought software unpatentable.  The Patent Office 
agreed and initially took the position that software was not patentable.  Examination of 
Patent Applications on Computer Programs, 33 Fed. Reg. 15,609-10 (Oct. 22, 1968).  
Software patents now generate annual patent licensing revenue in the billions.  In 2006, IBM 
alone earned more than $ 1 billion in royalty revenue, largely from software patents.  IBM, 
2006 Annual Report, 80, available at ftp://ftp.software.ibm.com/annualreport/2006/2006 ibm 
annual.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2010). 
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rights, all flowing from the general right of continued access to data (in 
its broadest sense) which has been lawfully acquired or created: 
1.  The right to “move to the winning standard.” 
This right would not guarantee a cost-free upgrade to a new 
technology but would simply guarantee that no legal impediments be 
placed in the way of the transfer.  Such a right would reduce the risk of 
adopting a technological advance while there is still competition to 
become the industry standard and would make it easier for users to 
move to new technologies earlier in their development cycle.  Since 
technologies must become commercially successful in order to provide a 
return to the innovators, and since money has a time value, facilitating 
early adoption of technologies helps promote progress.  An example 
would be the right to copy a Beta videotape to a VHS videotape. 
2.  The right to remain up to date. 
Broader than the right to move from a losing contender for industry 
standard to the winner, this right would likewise not guarantee a cost-
free upgrade to a newer version of technology but would simply 
guarantee that no legal impediments be placed in the way of the 
upgrade.  Such a right would assure that a producer of technology could 
not force users to choose between upgrading to other technology or 
losing meaningful access to data. 
3.  The right to choice of embodiment. 
Broader still than the right to remain up to date, this right would 
again not guarantee a cost-free conversion from one medium to another 
but would simply guarantee the absence of legal impediments.  In the 
music context, it would guarantee that a purchaser of music in any 
format could not be prevented from embodying that music in a different 
format or medium in order to play it on whatever device was most 
convenient for the user.  An example would be the right to transfer a 
tune from an 8-track tape to CD.  Arguably, in the context of digital 
music this right is already provided by § 117 of the Copyright Act. 
4.  The right to terminate Digital Rights Management. 
Faced with the problem that digital copies had become cheap and 
simple to make and resulted in little or no degradation from the 
original, Congress enacted legislation requiring equipment 
manufacturers to provide mechanisms to prevent copying and made it 
illegal to provide technology that subverted those mechanisms.  
Consistent with the Intellectual Property Clause requirement that 
exclusive rights be granted for limited times, any digital rights 
management restraints that have been incorporated in a work should be 
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rendered inoperative no later than the date on which the last of the 
intellectual property rights protected by the DRM expires.  In the 
patent context, keeping an invention from the public outside of the term 
of the patent constitutes suppression, resulting in loss of patent rights, if 
prior to filing a patent application, and a possible violation of antitrust 
laws if after the expiration of the patent.  The goal of tying DRM to the 
copyright term could be accomplished by incorporating a time limit in 
the DRM device itself, or by placing codes for disabling the device in 
escrow and granting users access to the escrow at the appropriate time. 
A.  The Preferred Solution: A Statutory Right to “Technology-Shifting” 
“[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the 
scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors,”255 and 
there are several reasons why it would be preferable that Congress do 
so.  A statute could provide a clear, comprehensive, uniform, and 
certain set of rights much more quickly than a series of cases could, even 
in the unlikely event that all of the cases were consistent and the 
collection of cases were comprehensive in coverage. 
Congress has the power to impose the proposed restrictions, has 
exercised similar power in the past, and is limited only by the 
constitutional requirement that it grant “exclusive” rights.  Congress has 
the power to decide which inventions and works of authorship to 
protect and for how long.256  The exclusive right that Congress is 
authorized to secure to authors and inventors owes its existence solely 
to the acts of Congress securing it,257 from which it follows that the rights 
granted by a patent or copyright are subject to such qualifications and 
limitations as Congress sees fit to impose.258 
Examples of prior limitations, which Congress has placed on a 
patent or copyright owner’s exclusive rights include the following: 
In the copyright area, Congress has repeatedly provided exceptions 
to copyright owners’ rights without running afoul of the requirement to 
grant “exclusive” rights.  It has provided a fair use exception to all types 
 
255. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 (2003) (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)). 
256. “Congress is free to amend § 101 so as to exclude from patent protection 
organisms produced by genetic engineering.”  Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 
(1980) (holding living organisms patentable under the current statute); see also Eldred, 537 
U.S. at 186 (Congress is free to set the term of copyrights.). 
257. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 660 (1834); Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 
86 (1899). 
258. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 662; Evans v. Jordan, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199, 204 (1815).
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of copyrights.259  It has also provided exceptions applicable to certain 
types of copyrights, for example those relating to computer programs,260 
and those covering sound recordings,261 and has created exceptions to a 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights (for example, fair use,262 library and 
archive copying,263 ephemeral recordings,264 and compulsory licenses for 
phonorecords and cable).265 
Congress has also chosen to exempt certain activities from copyright 
infringement but imposed a tax to generate a fund to be distributed to 
the copyright owners to deal with digital copying of audio 
performances.266  The Copyright Royalty Tribunal system is another 
 
259. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006), discussed supra note 169. 
260. 17 U.S.C. 117, discussed supra note 187. 
261. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) provides the exclusive right “to distribute copies or 
phonorecords . . . to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending.”  However, 17 U.S.C. § 109 (to which 106 is subject) permits the lawful owner of an 
embodiment of a copyrighted work to transfer that copy. 
262. 17 U.S.C. § 107, discussed supra note 169, provides that: “the fair use of a 
copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement 
of copyright.” 
263. 17 U.S.C. § 108(a) provides that:  
[I]t is not an infringement of copyright for a library or archives . . . to reproduce no 
more than one copy or phonorecord of a work . . . or to distribute such copy or 
phonorecord, under the conditions specified by this section if—(1) the reproduction 
or distribution is made without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial 
advantage; (2) the collections of the library or archives are (i) open to the public, or 
(ii) available not only to researchers affiliated with the library or archives or with 
the institution of which it is a part, but also to other persons doing research in a 
specialized field; and (3) the reproduction or distribution of the work includes a 
notice of copyright . . . . 
264. See 17 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
265. See 17 U.S.C. § 111(d) (compelling license for cable systems); 17 U.S.C. § 115(a) 
(compelling license for distributed phonorecords).
 266. “A ‘digital audio copied recording’ is a reproduction in a digital recording 
format of a digital musical recording, whether that reproduction is made directly from 
another digital musical recording or indirectly from a transmission.”  17 U.S.C. § 
1001(1).   
A “digital audio recording device” is any machine or device of a type commonly 
distributed to individuals for use by individuals, whether or not included with or as 
part of some other machine or device, the digital recording function of which is 
designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is capable of, making a 
digital audio copied recording for private use . . . . 
17 U.S.C. § 1001(3).   
No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based 
on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a digital audio recording device, 
a digital audio recording medium, an analog recording device, or an analog 
recording medium, or based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a 
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example of the royalty/tax coupled with mandatory licensing regime.267 
In the patent area, Congress may exercise the legislative right to 
exclude certain classes of inventions from patent protection268 and has 
done so both generally269 and with respect to specific types of 
technology.  For example, Congress has limited patents to four 
categories of statutory subject matter.270  Congress has permitted patents 
to be granted for medical procedures but has limited enforcement of 
those patents to the point where there is no practical value to such 
patents.  Congress has made patents on business methods subject to 
special defenses not applicable to other types of patents.  In addition, 
certain inventions related to atomic weapons are completely excluded 
from patentability even though they are statutory subject matter.271 
B.  Judicial Intervention 
For the reasons discussed above, legislative action is the preferred 
way to restore the balance.  There are, however, advantages to judicial 
action in areas of rapid technological advances in general.  In order to 
pass a statute, it is necessary that the problem be recognized, that its 
consequences be predicted, and that political agreement on the nature 
of the problem and the appropriate solution be reached—generally a 
time-consuming process.  Therefore, until Congress takes such action, 
there is support for judicial recognition that current statutory rights are 
subject to a constitutionally required right of technology-shifting. 
It is arguable that the copyright first sale doctrine, permitting the 
owner of a copyrighted work to “transfer” it, is by its terms broad 
enough to permit “transfer” not to a new owner but to a new format. 
 
device or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical 
recordings.  
17 U.S.C. § 1008.  In effect, taxes are paid on the medium used for copying, the revenue is 
distributed to copyright holders, and end-users are immune from liability for copyright 
infringement. 
267. This system is equivalent to a tax coupled with exemption from infringement 
liability. 
268. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (excluding certain nuclear energy technology from 
patent protection); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) (“Congress is 
free to amend § 101 so as to exclude from patent protection organisms produced by genetic 
engineering.”). 
269. Examples of general exceptions include the requirement that to be patentable an 
invention must fall within one of four enumerated categories.  35 U.S.C. § 101. 
270. Id. 
271. The exclusion is contained, not in the patent statute, but in the Atomic Energy 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2006). 
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To the extent the technology in question is a computer program 
within the meaning of the copyright statute,272 the owner of a lawful copy 
(for example, music embodied in a CD) already has the right, under 17 
U.S.C. § 117, to make copies and adaptations required for utilization in 
conjunction with a machine, or by extension, necessary for the 
“effective” use of the embodiment to enjoy the music.273  The statutory 
definition of a “computer program” as “a set of statements or 
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to 
bring about a certain result”274 does not resolve a grey area between 
instructions and “data”—as programmers know, “one man’s data is 
another man’s command.”275  Courts could therefore intervene on 
narrow grounds of statutory interpretation. 
To the extent the technology in question is a consumer product, 
there is another avenue of narrow intervention based on consumer 
expectations as to the rights acquired upon purchase of a product 
incorporating protected technology (for example a CD or DVD).  The 
distinction between the product and the incorporated intellectual 
property is recognized in both copyright and patent law.276  For example, 
purchasers of CDs or DVDs do not acquire the copyright in the music 
or movie, but they certainly acquire something more than mere 
ownership of the plastic.  At a minimum, they also acquire a license to 
play the music or watch the movie.277  The general presumption is that a 
 
272. 17 U.S.C. § 101 defines a “computer program” as “a set of statements or 
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain 
result.”  17 U.S.C. § 117 then provides the substantive user rights (or, alternatively, 
restrictions on the rights granted the copyright owners) associated with computer software. 
273. See 6 MELVILLE B. NIMMER  & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 
8.08[B][1][b] (Dec. 2009) (“‘[t]he trend is to read Section 117 broadly’” (quoting DSC 
Communs. Corp. v. Pulse Communs., 976 F. Supp. 359, 362 (E.D. Va. 1997), rev’d in part, 170 
F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923 (1999) and “loading onto the hard drive 
should be viewed as ‘essential’ to the optimal utilization of the subject computer program 
marketed on floppies or on discs”)). 
274. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
275. This aphorism appears to have originated in a 1973 presentation by C. J. 
Stephenson of Stanford University. C. J. Stephenson, On the Structure and Control of 
Commands (One Man’s Data Are Another Man’s Command), PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
FOURTH SYMPOSIUM ON OPERATING SYSTEM PRINCIPLES (Thomas J. Watson Research 
Center, N.Y.). 
276. “Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is 
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.”  17 U.S.C. § 
202 (2006). 
277. The CONTU Final Report states that “[o]bviously, creators, lessors, licensors, and 
vendors of copies of [computer] programs intend that they be used by their customers, so that 
rightful users would but rarely need a legal shield against potential copyright problems.  It is 
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license is perpetual unless the parties indicate otherwise.278  It would 
seem inconsistent with the concept of ownership if a purchaser lost the 
right to enjoy the purchase simply because the machinery necessary to 
play it became obsolete and no longer available.  Congress certainly did 
not think so, at least in terms of copyright protection.  The CONTU 
Final Report states, “Obviously, . . . vendors [of computer programs]279 
intend that they be used by their customers, so that rightful users would 
but rarely need a legal shield against potential copyright problems.”280  
Early advertisements for phonographs and records emphasized the 
value of owning a record: the music would be “yours for keeps,”281 and 
John Philip Sousa contemplated a cupboard full of such recordings 
supplanting the demand for live performances.282  Patent law’s 
authorization of repair of patented products so as to extend their utility 
similarly supports the concept that the license is perpetual and medium-
independent.283  On the other hand, medium-limited licenses open the 
 
easy to imagine, however, a situation in which the copyright owner might desire, for good 
reason or none at all, to force a lawful owner or possessor of a copy to stop using a particular 
program.  One who rightfully possesses a copy of a program, therefore, should be provided 
with a legal right to copy it to that extent which will permit its use by that possessor.”  
CONTU FINAL REPORT,  supra note 185, at 13. 
278. “[A patent] license without expressed limit as to time is a license for the unexpired 
life of the patent.” Fitch v. Shubert, 20 F. Supp. 314, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (citing St. Paul 
Plow-Works v. Starling, 140 U.S. 184 (1891)); “[w]here an assignment or license [of a 
copyright] does not expressly prescribe the period or term of its duration, it will generally be 
construed (in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent) to be effective for the duration of 
the then existing copyright term of the work.”  TV Globo Ltda. v. Brazil Up-Date Weekly, 
Inc., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1478, 1479 (1999) (citing NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.10(F), at 
10–98).  Technically, the cases hold that the license is for the term of the copyright (or 
patent), but this is in effect a perpetual license since once the copyright or patent expires 
there is no longer a need for the license. 
279. There does not appear to be a reason to distinguish computer programs from 
modern music or video products. 
280. CONTU FINAL REPORT, supra note 185, at 13. 
281. See, e.g., RCA Victrola ad, National Geographic Magazine (National Geographic 
Society) Vol. LXXV No. Two, Feb. 1939 at 275: “The World’s Greatest Artists are Yours for 
Keeps on Victor Records. They’ll thrill you with the music you love whenever you desire.” 
282. Alex Ross, The Record Effect: How Technology has Transformed the Sound of 
Music, THE NEW YORKER, June 6, 2005, at 94.   
Ninety-nine years ago, John Philip Sousa predicted that recordings would lead to the 
demise of music.  The phonograph, he warned . . . [would] put professional 
musicians out of work.  “The time is coming when no one will be ready to submit 
himself to the ennobling discipline of learning music,” he wrote.  “Everyone will 
have their ready made or ready pirated music in their cupboards.”  
Id. 
283. For a detailed discussion of the rights of an owner to repair a patented product, 
see Max Stul Oppenheimer, Yours for Keeps: MGM v. Grokster, 23 J. MARSHALL J. 
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possibility for a potentially troublesome business model built around 
periodically planned obsolescence of certain formats in order to create 
new demand, and the incentive to do so is great.284 
While these approaches are attractive ways of protecting certain 
innovators and consumers, they only apply in limited situations and they 
rely on interpretation of the current statutes and therefore could be 
defeated by Congress.  A broad, constitutionally based solution is 
preferable.  The courts have intervened on this basis in the past.  The 
Supreme Court solved the problem of patents being issued on trivial 
technological advances in 1850,285 long before Congress enacted a statute 
to deal with the issue in 1952.286  The Supreme Court recognized the 
right of fair use long before Congress codified it in 17 U.S.C. § 107, and 
the Court applied the right in order to protect non-commercial time-
shifting.287  These prior judicial decisions were made in the light of the 
technology of the time.  Now that a fuller picture of the comprehensive 
impact of technological development and related obsolescence has 
emerged, it is time for an equally comprehensive right of technology-
shifting. 
 
 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 209 (2005). 
284. The cost of the new sales would be low; the work has already been created and all 
that needs to be done is convert the format.  The model is similar to Disney’s “vault” model.  
See, e.g., Thomas K. Arnold, ‘Bambi’ is Back—for 70 ‘II’ Days, USAToday.com (Feb. 6, 
2006), http://www.usatoday.com/life/movies/news/2006-02-06-bambi_x.htm (noting that at the 
time thirty films were scheduled for re-release moratorium and that the strategy allowed 
maintaining prices—“if you keep it on the shelves, the only option you have is to keep 
repricing it, lower and lower.”); Robert La Franco, Eisner’s Bumpy Ride, FORBES, July 5, 
1999, at 50.  
285. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850). 
286. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
287. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (“[E]ven the 
unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents’ programs is legitimate fair use.”). 
